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I. INTRODUCTION

According to the strict form of originalism, the Constitution derives its
authority from its ratification during particular periods in American history.
Under this view, any departure from the understandings of those discrete
periods robs constitutional interpretation of its claim to legitimacy.' The political theory underlying strict originalism is a form of social contract theory:
unelected judges may displace legislative decisions in the name of the Constitution, but only because the Constitution is a social contract to which consent was
validly given through ratification.
Although there are very few strict originalists, 3 virtually all practitioners of
and commentators on constitutional law accept that original meaning has some
relevance to constitutional interpretation. 4 Most, if not all, of us are what Paul
interested in "the framers'
Brest has called "moderate" originalists;5 we are
6
intent on a relatively abstract level of generality.",

1. See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204,
204 (1980) (describing strict textualism and strict intentionalism as two branches of strict originalism).
2. Originalists typically do not invoke social contract theory directly, instead arguing that original
meaning should guide constitutional interpretation because the judiciary would otherwise be unconstrained. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 365 (1977) (noting "prevailing distrust of unbounded judicial interpretive discretion"
during the Founding era); ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF
THE LAW 352 (1990) ("Once adherence to the original understanding is weakened or abandoned, a
judge, perhaps instructed by a revisionist theorist, can reach any result ....); ANTONIN SCALA, A
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 45 (1997) (stating that "the difficulties

and uncertainties of determining original meaning and applying it to modem circumstances are
negligible compared with the difficulties and uncertainties of the philosophy which says that the
Constitution changes"). But this invocation of the countermajoritarian difficulty does not explain why originalists choose original meaning as the vehicle for constraining judges. In my view, most arguments for relying on
original meaning rather than some other constraint depend on the claim that the Ratifiers' views are preferred
because their act of consent confers legitimacy on judicial power exercised in the Constitution's name.
See, e.g., BORK, supra, at 351-55 (implicitly adopting popular consent as the benchmark of legitimacy).
I do not contend that social contract theory in general entails originalism, however. One could, for
example, rely on notions of tacit contemporary consent to existing structures as a justification for
interpretation according to contemporary understandings. Alternatively, one might use an imaginary
social contract as a vehicle for deciding what fundamental principles a society ought to endorse. See,
e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 118-92 (1971). In this article, I generally use the term social
contract theory to refer to theories that trace legitimacy to historical acts of consent. See infra note 41
(discussing the historical role of social contract theory in constitutional law).
3. Raoul Berger comes closest, perhaps. See generally BERGER, supra note 2.
4. See Sanford Levinson, The Limited Relevance of Originalism in the Actual Performance of Legal
Roles, 19 HARv.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 495,495-96 (1996).
5. Brest, supra note 1, at 205.
6. Id. at 214. See also Cass R. Sunstein, Five Theses on Originalism, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
311, 313 (1996) (describing a "soft originalist" as one who "will take the Framers' understanding to a
certain level of abstraction or generality").
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Moderate originalism provides an incomplete descriptive account of modem
constitutional law, however.7 Squaring the existing constitutional order with
original meaning requires either that we supplement the original understanding
with additional interpretive devices 8 or that we describe the Framers' intent at
such a high level of generality that it does not provide guidance in deciding
most concrete cases. As a result, the moderate originalist judge must rely on
factors other than original meaning in order to explain the existing constitutional order.9 Thus, moderate originalism faces the challenge of justifying the
use of nonoriginalist techniques without sacrificing its account of legitimacy.' 0
Many theorists reject the social contract theory that I believe underlies both
strict and moderate originalism. Accordingly, they reject originalism as the
proper starting point for constitutional interpretation. Needless to say, these
nonoriginalists do not find the nonoriginalist elements of the existing constitutional order problematic.l' Like moderate originalists, however, nonoriginalists
encounter a gap between their normative and their descriptive accounts of
constitutional law. The originalist must explain nonoriginalist decisions. Conversely, the nonoriginalist must explain the significant role that arguments based
on original meaning play in constitutional law. Such gaps are problematic
because theories of constitutional law usually strive for normative attractiveness
as well as descriptive accuracy.
This article considers various approaches to narrowing the gap between
theoretical accounts of original meaning and constitutional practice. In the first
half of the article, I describe the efforts to bridge the normative/descriptive gap
by scholars who accept the social-contractarian premises of originalism in one
form or another. In the second half of the article, I propose an alternative
account of arguments based on original meaning--one that for the most part
does not rest on social-contractarian premises.
Part II describes Henry Monaghan's use of stare decisis to reconcile the
existing nonoriginalist constitutional order with originalist tenets. 12 Although
Monaghan's analysis proves instructive, he ultimately (and deliberately) raises
more questions than he answers.

7. See Brest, supra note 1, at 223-24.
8. See id. at 222-24; Sunstein, supra note 6, at 313-14.
9. One alternative, proposed by Alfred Hill, is to look to what the Framers would have thought about
a constitutional question as it applies to our time, rather than looking to what they thought about the
analogous question in their time. See Alfred Hill, The PoliticalDimension of ConstitutionalAdjudication, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1239, 1240 (1990). This approach may be more consistent with the Framers'
goals than strict originalism. To my mind, however, this is merely the abstraction problem in a different
form. How do we begin to answer the question of what James Madison would have thought about
federalism in 1995 or of what the Reconstruction Congress would have thought about abortion in 1973?
We fool ourselves if we believe that Hill's hypothetical enterprise produces answers beyond those we
supply ourselves.
10. See Henry P. Monaghan, Stare Decisis and ConstitutionalAdjudication, 88 CoLuM. L. REv. 723
(1988).
11. I include myself in the nonoriginalist category.
12. See Monaghan, supra note 10.
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Part III construes Bruce Ackerman's We the People' 3 as an effort to retain the
social-contractarian premises of originalism while legitimating the open-ended
approach to interpretation characteristic of the Supreme Court's most important
nonoriginalist opinions. Yet the Part concludes that Ackerman's account is at
most a theory of legitimacy, not one of interpretation, because his political
theory does not generate the interpretive principles necessary to produce many
of the landmark nonoriginalist precedents of the modem era. Part III ends by
exploring a variant of Ackerman's approach recently proposed by Lawrence
Lessig and concludes that this account shares the descriptive weakness of
Ackerman's theory.
Part IV examines what I term "eclectic" accounts of constitutional law.
Eclectics recognize that courts employ a variety of forms of argument-some
based on social-contractarian premises, others not so based.' 4 I identify Philip
Bobbit15 and Richard Fallon16 as the proponents of the leading eclectic accounts. Although I find constitutional eclecticism somewhat appealing, I argue
that eclectics have not yet explained how to integrate arguments that are based
on seemingly inconsistent theories of legitimacy. For illustrative purposes I
focus on one particular aspect of this difficulty-the failure of eclectics to
provide an adequate explanation of how nonoriginalist arguments sometimes
outweigh originalist ones.
A well-known example illustrates this particular weakness. In Bolling v.
Sharpe, 7 the companion case to Brown v. Board of Education,18 the Supreme
Court held that the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause prohibits racially
segregated public schools in the District of Columbia.19 Bolling seems very
difficult to reconcile with strict originalism; the slaveowners who ratified the
Fifth Amendment probably did not imagine that it would require separate-butequal schools-much less integrated ones-for African Americans. 20 A true
strict originalist may have to conclude that Boiling is simply illegitimate and
13. 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991).

14. I am using the term "eclecticism" more or less synonymously with Stephen Griffin's use of the
term "pluralism." See Stephen M. Griffin, Pluralism in Constitutional Interpretation,72 TEx. L. REv.
1753, 1753 (1994) (stating that "[p]luralistic theories of constitutional interpretation hold that there are
multiple legitimate methods of interpreting the Constitution"). I prefer the former term because I wish
to avoid two possible connotations of pluralism: first, its association with the concept of cultural
pluralism; and second, its suggestion that there may be more than one right answer to a constitutional
question. Eclecticism, as I use the term, entails no necessary view with respect to either of these issues.
15. See PHILIP BOBBrrr, CONsTITtmONAL INTERPRETATION 11-22 (1991) (acknowledging and analyz-

ing six forms of interpretive argument and their application).
16. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation,

100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1209-30 (1987) (addressing problem of coherence where various constitutional arguments are used by courts).
17. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
18. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
19. Bolling, 347 U.S. at 499.
20. Indeed, long after the Founding, even in the North, free blacks were subject to segregated
schools and transportation. See LEON F. LrrWACK, NORTH OF SLAVERY: THE NEGRO INTHE FREE STATES,
1790-1860, at 97-99 (1961).
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therefore must be overruled. How would an eclectic reach a different conclusion?
The eclectic might initially argue that the Fifth Amendment must be read in
the light of the Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibits states from denying
citizens the equal protection of the laws. But then what role does original
understanding play? The historical evidence indicates that even the Equal
Protection Clause was not generally thought to prohibit racially segregated
schools at the time of its adoption.2 '
Ultimately, the eclectic will remind us that she is, after all, not a thoroughgoing originalist. The fact that one factor--original understanding-points in the
direction of a given interpretation is not sufficient to overcome the other factors,
which here point in the opposite direction. Yet this maneuver tends to discredit
the eclectic's invocation of history: sometimes she invokes history to support a
conclusion she already endorses; other times she deems history outweighed or
irrelevant. Perhaps this account accurately describes much Supreme Court
practice, but it provides a weak normative basis for that practice.
In Parts V through VII, I propose a different method of integrating originalist
and nonoriginalist arguments. I contend that most arguments based on original
understanding need not rest on the social-contractarian assumptions of conventional originalism.
Part V identifies one reason why original meaning matters--even if one
rejects the social-contractarian premises of conventional originalism. Once we
accept that the constitutional text is binding law-for whatever reason or
reasons-interpretation of the text will sometimes entail considering the meaning that the text was originally intended to bear. The history of the period
surrounding the adoption of a constitutional provision may shed light on the
kinds of problems that inspired an otherwise obscure clause. In other words, to
make sense of text, we often need to know something about context.
I would be less than candid were I to claim that a scheme in which original
meaning serves only to provide context for otherwise obscure provisions provides a complete descriptive account of the practice of constitutional interpretation. The Supreme Court continues to give arguments based on original meaning
a considerably wider scope. Accordingly, Part VI proposes two related models
21. For an excellent summary of the historical record, see Herbert Hovenkamp, The Cultural Crises
of the Fuller Court, 104 YALE L.J. 2309, 2337-43 (1995) (reviewing OwEN M. Fiss, TROUBLED
BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 1888-1910 (1993)). Hovenkamp notes that in its day, the separatebut-equal doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), was largely uncontested. Hovenkamp,
supra, at 2339. The proponents of the Fourteenth Amendment, Hovenkamp argues, championed
political but not social equality. See id. at 2340. He observes that under Reconstruction, the South
moved from a regime of exclusion of blacks from public places and accommodations, to a regime of
separate-but-equal. See id. at 2340-41. Although arguments can be constructed to cast some doubt on
the historical consensus, see Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the DesegregationDecisions, 81
VA. L. REV. 947 (1995), it remains the consensus. See, e.g., Hovenkamp, supra, at 2342 (stating that
historians who identify social integration with the prevailing view in 1868 or 1896 "are simply
wrong"); Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and ConstitutionalTheory: A Response to Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881 (1995).
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for understanding the role such arguments play. The models do not rely on
social-contractarianism, however.
I call the first noncontractarian model ancestral originalism. Under this
model, studying the Framers' vision explains a good deal about the political
system we have inherited in the same way that studying the history of a culture
explains much about its present. I call the second model heroic originalism.
Under heroic originalism, we value the Framers' views because we believe they
were farsighted enough to create a Constitution that has endured for over two
centuries, and because their philosophy of limited government and the means
they chose to implement it remain remarkably relevant to our current problems.
I contend that much of what passes for social-contractarian originalism in
Supreme Court opinions may be better understood as some combination of
ancestral and heroic originalism.
Part VI next explores the relation between pre- and post-enactment history
under nonsocial-contractarian originalism. I contend that ancestral and heroic
originalism fit within a larger view of historical argument in which the Nation's
history both before and after the adoption of a constitutional provision teaches
lessons about the provision's meaning. In some instances, post-enactment history will support the views of the Framers; in other instances, it will refute those
views. Moreover, by focusing on the lessons of history, my proposed models
provide a smoother boundary between originalist and nonoriginalist arguments
than does conventional eclecticism.
Part VII acknowledges that contractarian originalism must play a small but
significant role in constitutional interpretation because of our ultimate commitment to popular sovereignty. At least in the case of a recently enacted constitutional provision, the intent of the Framers and Ratifiers may be relevant in the
conventional social-contractarian sense. During the period immediately following a provision's adoption, ignoring its intended effect can be tantamount to
denying the People's right to make fundamental law.
Before elaborating on my thesis, I should say a few words about legitimacy.
Theorists like Monaghan and Ackerman (as well as less sophisticated originalists) who begin with originalist premises treat legitimacy as the central question
of constitutional law. Eclectics, by contrast, tend to elevate descriptive accuracy
over legitimacy concerns. Indeed, Bobbitt, discussed in Part IV, believes that
constitutional theory's usual concern for legitimacy is misguided from the
outset.22 Not surprisingly,
legitimacy theorists and eclectics typically have little
23
to say to one another.
In seeking to bridge the gap between normative and descriptive accounts of
constitutional law, I also hope to bring together the insights of both legitimacy

22. See BOBBrrr, supra note 15, at 9-10.
23. Monaghan is an exception, as he clearly manifests an interest in both legitimacy and descriptive
accuracy. See infra Part 1H.
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theorists and eclectics. I do not think that legitimacy questions can be dismissed, but I also reject the social-contractarian account of legitimacy given by
conventional originalism. Accordingly, to the extent that one believes that the
social-contractarian premises of conventional originalism are necessary to maintain the legitimacy of constitutional interpretation, one will reject ancestral and
heroic originalism. In my view, however, the legitimacy claims of originalists
are unpersuasive.
We should be clear about why legitimacy concerns typically play such an
important role in the debate over constitutional interpretation.24 When the
Supreme Court (or any other court) interprets the Constitution to bar state or
federal action, the countermajoritarian difficulty arises.2 5 What legitimates the
Court's substitution of its view of the Constitution for that of a representative
body? Social-contractarian originalism proposes to answer this question by
denying that the Court substitutes its own view of the Constitution; rather, the
Court substitutes the view of the Framers and Ratifiers.
There are two principal difficulties with this contractarian response. First, it is
hardly self-evident that one can discern the views of the Framers and Ratifiers
without engaging in a highly subjective interpretive enterprise.26 Second, and
perhaps more fundamentally, why should modem judges prefer the views of the
Framers and Ratifiers to their own? The short version of the objection to socialcontractarian originalism is that it replaces one countermajoritarian difficulty
with another. Troubled by the prospect of unelected judges substituting their
judgments for the judgments of elected legislators, originalists propose instead
that judges defer to the views of the Framers and Ratifiers of the Constitution.
Yet the Framers and Ratifiers do not represent current majorities,2 7 and even in
their day only represented a small subset of the adult population. Thus, originalism is not a normatively attractive solution to the countermajoritarian difficulty.

24. It remains to be seen whether legitimacy concerns have practical importance. Alan Hyde has
argued that as a causal matter, habit, fear of sanctions, and individual conviction explain why people
submit to governmental authority to a greater extent than the hypothesis that they believe the
government to be legitimate, see Alan Hyde, The Concept of Legitimation in the Sociology of Law,
1983 Wis. L. REV. 379, 386-400, and that even assuming legitimacy plays a causal role in ensuring
stability, public perceptions of law play a negligible role in forming public opinion about legitimacy.
See id. at 400-18. Hyde concludes that legitimacy "has no clear operational meaning, nor agreed upon
empirical referent." Id. at 426. It does not follow, however, that legitimacy is a useless concept. In this
article, I treat concerns about legitimacy as a particular subclass of concerns about justice. Legitimacy
refers to the justice of institutional allocations of power, rather than to the justice of particular
applications of governmental power. But see id. at 419 (contending that legitimacy is not a helpful
concept for critiquing social institutions, although recognizing that social institutions may be "just or
unjust").
25. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR
OF PoLICs 16 (1962).
26. Laurence Tribe and I have argued this point at some length elsewhere. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE &
MICHAEL C. DoRF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 31-64 (1991).
27. Cf Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013,
1046 (1984) (arguing that the countermajoritarian difficulty is in fact an "intertemporal" difficulty).
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The authority of the Constitution today rests on its general acceptance as
authoritative rather than on its adoption in 1787.28 For example, constitutional
text matters because of the widespread contemporary acceptance of the text as a
necessary starting point for interpretation. 2 9 Nevertheless, as I argue in Part VII,
there are circumstances in which something like the social-contractarian account of legitimacy ought to drive interpretation to give greater deference to
original meaning than such original meaning would receive under a purely
nonoriginalist approach.
On the whole, however, I take legitimacy to be a weak criterion for constitutional interpretation. Many different approaches to interpretation are legitimate
in the sense that decisions rendered according to these approaches ought to and
will be accepted as binding law. Beyond this minimal requirement, though,
legitimacy should not be viewed as an on/off condition. Instead, legitimacy
should be viewed as a matter of degree: That one interpretive technique is, in
some cases, more legitimate than another does not render the less legitimate
approach illegitimate. Therefore, the minimal requirement of legitimacy does
not dictate any particular interpretive theory. Instead, the degree of legitimacy
of an interpretive technique is merely one of many factors that may recommend
it.

The ultimate test of any constitutional theory is two-fold: how well does it
describe the actual practice of constitutional law and how well does it justify
that practice? 3°-in short, how well it bridges the descriptive/normative gap. A
largely nonsocial-contractarian account is best suited for this task.
IX. STARE DECISIS AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

Suppose that a judge believes that the only legitimate method of interpreting
the Constitution requires her to apply its provisions as they were generally
understood at the time of their adoption. Perhaps she holds this view because
28. See Richard Fallon, The Rule of Law as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 27 (1997) ("The Constitution ... is law not because the Framers and Ratifiers said so, but
because we today accept it as such." (citing Frederick Schauer, Amending the Presuppositions of a
Constitution, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACrICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMEND-

MENT 145, 152-53 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995))); Kent Greenawalt, The Rule of Recognition and the
Constitution, 85 MIcH. L. REv. 621, 640 (1987) (contending that "the legal authority of... the original
Constitution is established by its continued acceptance and that the original ratification procedure is no
longer directly relevant to tracing what counts as law"). Locating the source of the Constitution's
authority in its general acceptance does not necessarily entail any particular approach to interpretation.
See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 124-30 (1986) (distinguishing between "strict" and "soft"
conventionalism as interpretive philosophies, and allowing that the latter may be an underdeveloped
version of Dworkin's model of law as integrity); id. at 138 (contending that most basic propositions in
Anglo-American law rest on argument rather than on convention, but allowing that "[p]erhaps all
judges do accept the authority of the Constitution as a matter of convention rather than as the upshot of
sound political theory").
29. See DWORKIN, supra note 28, at 358 ("Justices who are called liberal and those who are called
conservative agree about which words make up the Constitution as a matter of preinterpretive text.").
30. See id. at 90 ("General theories of law ... try to show legal practice as a whole in its best light,
to achieve equilibrium between legal practice as they find it and the best justification of that practice.").
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she believes that originalism alone can adequately constrain unelected judges,
or perhaps she believes-as a matter of social contract theory-that the maintenance of constitutional legitimacy requires strict adherence to the original
understanding of the contract. 3'
For now, however, let us put aside the question of why one might choose to
be a strict originalist. There remains the more basic question of whether one can
be a strict originalist. As an example, assume a newly appointed originalist
majority on the Supreme Court. Must these Justices overrule Brown v. Board of
Education, invalidate the administrative state, and abolish paper money? If
these pillars of the modem regime conflict with the original understanding, it
would seem that our originalist Court must either sacrifice them or sacrifice its
principles.32
In an important and carefully argued article, Henry Monaghan asks whether
stare decisis can bridge the gap between the modem constitutional regime and
original understanding.3 3 Monaghan begins with the frank admission that "a
significant portion of our constitutional order cannot reasonably be reconciled
with original understanding. ,34 He then argues that, at least in very important
cases, 35 stare decisis plays a vital role in legitimating the constitutional order
and, in lesser cases, promotes a conception of the law as impersonal.36
Monaghan might at this point try to argue that stare decisis enables originalist
judges. to retain the modem constitutional order through a ratchet mechanism:
old nonoriginalist precedents would be respected while new cases would be
decided on originalist premises. But such an approach would fail. First, it is not
clear how one would distinguish between "old" and "new" principles. The
Supreme Court rarely hears cases that present completely novel questions. The
typical case includes an inquiry into how far precedential cases extend and
whether those cases cover the instant case. 37 To respect nonoriginalist precedents would thus appear to require that they not merely be retained on their
facts, but that they also be permitted to expand to cover new situations.
More fundamentally, because Monaghan justifies the role of stare decisis in
instrumental terms, he opens the door for the justification of other nonoriginalist
sources of law. Both stare decisis and originalism contribute to the stability of
our legal system, but so do other interpretive techniques. For instance, if the
31. See Monaghan, supra note 10, at 739-41.
32. There is another sense in which it may not be possible to be an originalist. Sources of original
meaning are sometimes indeterminate, so that an interpreter will have to look to other sources to decide
a case. See Brest, supra note 1, at 209-17.
33. See Monaghan, supra note 10.
34. Id. at 723.
35. Monaghan states that stare decisis performs the function of limiting the agenda of constitutional
adjudication in such cases, whether or not they were rightly decided in the first instance. See id. at
744-46.
36. See id. at 749-53. The majority in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), sounds
similar themes. See id. at 864-69.
37. Monaghan, supra note 10, at 765. Accord Michael C. Doff, Dicta and Article II, 142 U. PA. L.
REV. 1997, 2056-57 (1994).
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public or a significant fraction of the public perceives some substantial set of
judicial decisions as manifestly unjust, the system's stability will be undermined. Therefore, the concern for stability should permit judges to interpret the
Constitution so that it conforms with contemporary notions of justice, even
when those notions contradict original understanding. Thus Monaghan approves
of the nonoriginalist decision in Brown v. Board of Education.38 Today that
decision may rest firmly on the ground of stare decisis, but when decided it was
justified in other, nonoriginalist terms.
Although he begins with a philosophical commitment to something like strict
originalism, Monaghan's pragmatism ultimately leads him to an eclectic approach to interpretation. Having demoted originalism from a matter of first
principle to a policy that judges should follow on the basis of a consequentialist
calculation, he cannot avoid other such calculations. Original meaning thus joins
"precedent, political equilibrium, and the need for change," as one of the factors that
judges should consider in constitutional decisionmaking, rather than maintaining its
position as the sole factor.3 9 As Monaghan recognizes, however, the theory that
justifies originalism as an all-encompassing ideology must differ from one that
embraces it only partially.n0 He leaves the construction of this latter theory to others.
HI. A KINDER, GENTLER ORIGINALISM

The social-contractarian political theory underlying originalism has deep
roots in American legal thought. 4' Therefore, theorists trying to account for the
38. See Monaghan, supra note 10, at 772-73.
39. Id. at 773.
40. See id.
41. See, e.g., Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798) (Chase, J.) (stating that a statute that
violates "the great first principles of the social compact[] cannot be considered a rightful exercise of
legislative authority"); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 471 (1793) (Jay, C.J.) (stating that
"the constitution of the United States is.likewise a compact made by the people of the United States").
See also Hovenkamp, supra note 21, at 2317-18 & nn.46-49 (collecting state and federal cases invoking
social contract theory). Hovenkamp notes that during the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court most
commonly invoked social contract principles to invalidate legislation when no constitutional text
clearly controlled. See id. at 2318-19. Late-twentieth-century originalists are unlikely to endorse this
version of social contract theory.
Social contract theory can have concrete consequences in the courts. For example, in United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214 (9th Cir. 1988), rev'd, 494 U.S. 259 (1990), a nonresident alien
raised a Fourth Amendment objection to the conduct of United States officials acting outside the United
States. The government argued that as a nonresident alien, the defendant was not a party to the
constitutional compact between the United States and its People. See id. at 1218. The court of appeals
majority acknowledged that the "compact theory of the Constitution has deep roots in our nation's
history," id. at 1219, but went on to argue that the compact theory is incomplete, emphasizing the
parallel natural rights tradition, under which rights such as those contained in the Fourth Amendment
belong to all people, even prior to their expression in the constitutional text. See id. at 1219-20.
Accordingly, the court held that the defendant could raise the Fourth Amendment issue. Noting the
Founders' debt to John Locke, the dissent argued that the social contract view was the prevailing one,
and accordingly would have ruled that the defendant could not assert Fourth Amendment rights. See id.
at 1231-33 (Wallace, J., dissenting). See also Davis v. Fulton County, 884 F. Supp. 1245, 1254 n.7 (E.D.
Ark. 1995) (noting that social contract theory "seems to have informed[] our Nation's founders").
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existing nonoriginalist constitutional order often succumb to the temptation to
modify rather than to abandon originalism. In this Part, I argue that Bruce
Ackerman's much-discussed We the People accepts the social-contractarian
premises of conventional originalism, and consequently provides an inadequate
descriptive account of constitutional law. I then consider a variant of Ackerman's approach recently offered by Lawrence Lessig, about which I draw the
same conclusion.
A. WE THE PEOPLE

In the first 42 volume of We the People, Bruce Ackerman sets for himself the
task of liberating American constitutionalism from foreign influences.4 3 He
seeks an interpretive method grounded in characteristically American political
thought.44 He finds it in what he calls "dualist democracy" (or sometimes,
simply "dualism") 45 which encompasses the idea that American law proceeds
on two tracks: the higher track of fundamental law deriving from the People
themselves, and the lower track of ordinary legislation enacted by representative
bodies that comprise a mere shadow of the People.
Ackerman devotes much of We the People to showing that the processes of
constitutional amendment set out in Article V are not the exclusive means of
lawmaking on the higher track. Thus, Ackerman claims legitimacy for the
Fourteenth Amendment despite the fact that the Article V ratification procedures
were not strictly followed.4 6 More radically, he argues that the Supreme Court
decisions of the late 1930s and 1940s constituted an informal constitutional

amendment approving the growth of the modem administrative state. 47 Unsurprisingly, claims such as these 4 8 have inspired vigorous criticism by scholars
claiming that Ackerman's approach diverges too far from both the text and the
traditional understanding of the Constitution.4 9

42. As of this writing, the second volume of We the People, subtitled Transformations,is expected to
be published in early 1998. Conversation between Bruce Ackerman and Michael Dorf (April 17, 1997).
43. See AcKERMAN, supra note 13, at 3-6.
44. See id.
45. Id. at 6. Ackerman's use of "dualism" should not be confused with a different American
invention, dual sovereignty-the notion that state and national governments exercise overlapping
sovereignty. See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 1872 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (stating that "[flederalism was our Nation's own discovery").
46. See AcKERMAN, supra note 13, at 42, 44-47, 81-104.
47. See id. at 42-44, 47-50, 105-130.
48. More recently, Ackerman and David Golove have invoked the theory of informal amendment to
validate the use of Congressional-Executive agreements in lieu of the treaty power. See Bruce
Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?,108 HARv. L. REV. 799, 805 (1995).
49. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form
Method in ConstitutionalInterpretation, 108 HARv. L. REV. 1221 (1995). Cf Henry P. Monaghan, We
the People[s], Original Understanding,and ConstitutionalAmendment, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 121 (1996)
(critiquing the claim of Akhil R. Amar, The Consent of the Governed: ConstitutionalAmendment
Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 457 (1994) and Akhil R. Amar, PhiladelphiaRevisited: Amending
the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U. Cmn. L. REV. 1043 (1988), that the Constitution permits
amendments by a simple majority vote of the People).
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The debate inspired by Ackerman's work should not obscure the fact that at
an important level his description is widely accepted. Dualism is, by and large,
an accurate account of American constitutionalism. Indeed, the point seems so
50
obvious as hardly to require an elaborate theoretical defense. The Preamble
invokes the authority of "We the People of the United States." The Supremacy
Clause 5' declares the Constitution to be higher law. Only a particularly nearsighted reader of the Constitution could fail to notice the dualist character of the
system that it erects. 52
However, the fact that the text of the Constitution embraces dualism does not
suffice to show that the constitutional order is itself dualist. If it did, Ackerman
could not seriously advance his theory of informal constitutional amendments.
For Ackerman, text is merely one source of constitutional meaning, and not a
very important one at that.
To put the matter somewhat differently, Ackerman does not accept the moral
legitimacy of the words of the Constitution simply because the Constitution
claims legitimacy for itself in dualist terms. What if someone were to print an
alternative, say monarchist, constitution which declared itself to be the supreme
law of the land? 53 Correctly sensing that the text of the Constitution alone
cannot respond to such a challenge, Ackerman looks for a response in external
sources. For him, the possibility of an alternative constitution-or to make the matter
somewhat more realistic, a group of persons who deny the rightful authority of the
legal order over their lives--poses a challenge to the legitimacy of the Constitution.
Despite the apparent radicalism of Ackerman's views about informal constitutional amendments, his theory of legitimacy is extremely conventional. The
Constitution derives its legitimacy from the fact that the People, exercising their
higher lawmaking authority, approved it. Although Ackerman differs with strict
originalists on a number of important details, his basic philosophical commitments remain remarkably compatible with those of strict originalism. To understand the extent of this compatibility, consider the ways in which Ackerman
parts company with strict originalism.
First, for Ackerman the higher law status of the Constitution plays an
important role in constitutional interpretation-whereas strict originalists tend
to treat constitutional interpretation no differently from the interpretation of
some relatively minor regulatory statute. 4 At least as it is often caricatured,

50. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
51. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2, cl. 2.
52. See Suzanna Sherry, The Ghost of Liberalism Past, 105 HARv. L. REv. 918, 923 (1992) ("At its
simplest level, Ackerman's basic dualist thesis is unexceptionable."); id. at 927 (remarking that
Ackerman's historical account "requires a 'dualistic' view of the Constitution [only] in the most trivial
sense").
53. See Brest, supra note 1, at 225 ("[a]lthough Article VI declares that the Constitution is the
'supreme law of the land,' a document cannot achieve the status of law, let alone supreme law, merely
by its own assertion.").
54. See AcKERMAN, supra note 13, at 92-92.
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strict originalism assumes that each constitutional provision is a kind of statute
designed to accomplish a narrow task, so that it is appropriate to look at the
Framers' or Ratifiers' views at a quite specific level.55
Ackerman, by contrast, is a Marshallian when it comes to constitutional
purposes.5 6 He recognizes a significant role for the interpreter in filling gaps in
the broad outline of the Constitution.5 7 Thus, We the People includes a spirited
attack on the view that judges should not interpret the Constitution differently
from a minor statute.58
Yet Ackerman's sympathy for broad interpretations is not a repudiation of
originalism so much as a refinement of it. Even John Marshall, after all, invoked
the intent of the Framers in the course of his broad structural arguments. In
McCulloch v. Maryland,59 for example, Marshall prefaced his paean to the
breadth of constitutional purposes 60 with an invocation of the Framers' purposes. 6 ' And, in a familiar move, Ackerman critiques the narrowest version of
strict originalism by noting that the Framers themselves never intended for
future interpreters to follow their views-especially their subjective viewsslavishly.

62

When scholars point out that strict originalism is paradoxically self-defeating,
they often do so in order to show that the theory fails even on its own terms.6 3
55. This narrow approach does not even command the field of statutory interpretation. For a
different approach to statutory interpretation, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION (1994).

56. By "Marshallian," I mean one who believes with John Marshall that the Constitution should be
broadly construed in the light of its evident purposes. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316 (1819).
57. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Robert Bork's Grand Inquisition, 99 YALE L.J. 1419, 1430-34 (1990)
(book review criticizing Bork's parsimonious reading of the Ninth Amendment).
58. See ACKERMAN, supra note 13, at 90-92.
59. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
60. See id. at 407 ("A constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions of which its
great powers will admit, and of all the means by which they may be carried into execution, would
partake of the prolixity of a legal code, and could scarcely be embraced by the human mind. It would
probably never be understood by the public. Its nature, therefore, requires, that only its great outlines
should be marked, its important objects designated, and the minor ingredients which compose those
objects be deduced from the nature of the objects themselves .... In considering this question, then, we
must never forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding.").
61. See id. at 406-07 (stating that "[tihe men who drew and adopted [the Tenth Amendment] had
experienced the embarrassments resulting from the insertion of [the] word ['expressly'] in the articles
of confederation, and probably omitted it to avoid those embarrassments").
62. ACKERMAN, supra note 13, at 90-92 (criticizing Raoul Berger's view that the Fourteenth
Amendment should be interpreted as doing no more than authorizing the Civil Rights Act of 1866). See
also Hans W. Baade, "Original Intent" in Historical Perspective: Some Critical Glosses, 69 TEx. L.
REV. 1001, 1007 (1991) (criticizing Raoul Berger's variant of originalism because it contradicts the
English common-law rule that evidence of legislative history was inadmissible for statutory interpretation); Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative
Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1090 (1981) (criticizing Raoul Berger's view that the
adopters of the Fourteenth Amendment intended its provisions to be interpreted by "strict intentionalist
canons").

63. See, e.g., TRIBE & DORF, supra note 26, at 9-10; Baade, supra note 62, at 1004 ("An ahistorical
'originalism'. . . is barely short of a contradiction in terms.").
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But that is not Ackerman's goal. Ackerman, working from social-contractarian
premises, draws from the original understanding of the Framers and Ratifiers
the lesson that the constitutional interpreter should strive to effectuate the broad
purposes of the text approved by the People during earlier periods. Thus,
Ackerman's first point of departure from strict originalism-his substitution of a
broad view of original meaning for a narrow view-is consistent with the
philosophical premises of strict originalism. He seeks to improve social-contractarian originalism rather than to replace it.
The second point at which Ackerman departs from strict originalism concerns
intergenerational synthesis. 64 Where a strict originalist might take the view that
a judge must enforce the meaning of a clause under construction at the time of
the particular clause's enactment, Ackerman recognizes the need to synthesize
portions of the Constitution enacted during different eras to create a coherent
interpretation of the entire document. Thus, for Ackerman, a case such as
Lochner v. New York 65 reflects the efforts of the Justices of the post-Civil War
era6 6 to synthesize the Founders' commitment to individual liberty and the
Reconstruction Era's commitment to equality and restraints on state action.67
Similarly, he contends that Griswold v. Connecticut6 8 reflects the modern

Court's effort to preserve a zone of liberty traceable to the Founding era given
the New Deal era's recognition of broad government power over economic
69

affairs.

Although Ackerman's particular account of intergenerational synthesis is
problematic in ways I discuss below, 70 his general point is sound. Our Constitution was not created all at once. To use an example that does not rely on
informal amendments, consider the relevance of the Nineteenth Amendment to
the question of whether the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause
prohibits most forms of gender discrimination.
One can synthesize the Fourteenth and Nineteenth Amendments by arguing
that the two amendments prohibit gender discrimination in any context. The
Equal Protection Clause does not set forth particular proscribed bases for
government line drawing. Of course, it was adopted in the aftermath of the Civil
War and of the former Confederate states' adoption of Black Codes aimed at
depriving blacks of the rights of other free persons. Thus, it has long been
understood that the Equal Protection Clause proscribes invidious discrimination
against blacks, and by extension, against other racial groups. 71 Does the Equal
Protection Clause also proscribe gender discrimination? One way to answer this
64. See ACKERMAN, supra note 13, at 92-104.
65. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
66. Ackerman refers to the period from the end of the Civil War through (roughly) 1937 as the
"middle republic." See AcKERMAN, supra note 13, at 81-104.
67. See id. at 99-104.
68. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
69. See AcKERMAN, supra note 13, at 150-58.
70. See infra notes 73-95 and accompanying text.
71. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
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question would be to analogize gender discrimination to race discrimination.72
In addition, it would seem appropriate to search for guidance elsewhere in the
Constitution. Accordingly, one might take the view that the Nineteenth Amendment's proscription of gender discrimination in voting reflects a constitutional
commitment to treating gender-based classifications as presumptively illegitimate in other contexts as well.
On the other hand, one might approach the intergenerational problem by
arguing that the Nineteenth Amendment's prohibition on gender discrimination
only in voting implies that other forms of gender discrimination are permissible.
The maxim inclusio unius est exclusio alterius supports this approach. But
regardless of how one synthesizes the Fourteenth and Nineteenth Amendments,
it is clear that one should undertake some effort along these lines to give an
interpretation that accounts for the whole Constitution.
Ackerman's recognition of intergenerational issues-like his approach to
questions of the generality of the original intent-amounts to a refinement,
rather than a repudiation, of originalism. To know how the Constitution bears on
a contemporary problem, we must ask what commitments the People have made
on the higher law track. Significantly, for Ackerman, as for the strict originalist,
the People only act rarely and during discrete periods of time. The goal of
constitutional interpretation for both Ackerman and the strict originalist is to
73
preserve the work of the People during periods of normal politics.
To be sure, some of what the strict originalist would deem normal politicsfor example, the New Deal-Ackerman classifies as higher lawmaking. Moreover, Ackerman has a more sophisticated view of preservation than does the
strict originalist. Yet these differences should not obscure the fact that Ackerman's theory, like strict originalism, is at bottom static, rather than dynamic.
Interpreters preserve and synthesize the work of earlier generations. Until the
People speak again, however, the Ackermanian interpreter does not permit the
Constitution to evolve.74
Of course, Ackerman readily admits that with the passage of time new issues
arise, so that preservation will require a kind of updating. But a sophisticated
originalist will recognize this process as the inevitable effort "to discern how
the framers' values, defined in the context of the world they knew, apply to the
world we know."'75 For Ackerman, as for the strict originalist, absent a constitutional
moment, changed social circumstances do not warrant a new interpretation.
72. See J.E.B.v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127,135-36 (1994).
73. See ACKERMAN, supra note 13, at 10 (discussing the "preservationist function" of the Constitution in dualist theory); id. at 264 (suggesting that during normal times, the Supreme Court should
"represent the absent People by forcing our elected politician/statesmen to measure their statutory
conclusions against the principles reached by those who have most successfully represented the People
in the past").
74. See id. at 261-65.
75. Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 995 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J.). See also William H. Rehnquist,
The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEx. L. REv. 693, 694-95 (1976) (accepting that the Constitution can be applied to factual circumstances unforeseen by the Framers).

1780

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 85:1765

The third major discrepancy between Ackerman and the strict originalist
concerns Ackerman's view of informal amendments. This difference is fundamental. From the strict originalist's perspective, the notion that the Constitution can
be amended without complying with the Article V procedures is radically
destabilizing. The unwritten, and thus uncertain, character of informal amendments robs the Constitution of its positivist character.
Nonetheless, it is precisely Ackerman's deep philosophical agreement with
strict originalism that drives him to posit the concept of informal constitutional
amendment. As a matter of substantive constitutional law, Ackerman is a New
Deal liberal: he approves of broad protection of individual rights, robust enforcement of equality norms, and an activist state in the economic realm. 76 The
simplest way to justify these positions would be to posit some conception of a
dynamic Constitution---drawing its meaning from economic, political, and social developments subsequent to the ratification of any given clause. Yet Ackerman does not follow this path. Why not?
For Ackerman to accept a dynamic Constitution, he would have to forego his
conception of dualism, which draws a sharp distinction between ordinary
lawmaking and higher lawmaking. The kinds of social developments that figure
in most dynamic or evolutionary accounts of constitutional interpretation occur
quite gradually rather than in discrete periods," and crucially, do not involve
the kind of engaged deliberation by the People that Ackerman characterizes as
the sine qua non of higher lawmaking.
Ackermanian dualism is not itself a feature of strict originalism. Indeed, as
noted above, Ackerman critiques strict originalism because it too often fails to
distinguish between the Constitution and ordinary legislation. Yet both Ackermanian dualism and strict originalism are firmly rooted in social-contractarianism-

76. See generally BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980).
77. As Frank Michelman has noted, Ackerman's distinction between normal politics and constitutional moments shares a great deal with Thomas Kuhn's distinction between normal science and
paradigm shifts. See Frank Michelman, The Republican Civic Tradition:Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J.
1493, 1521-23 (1988) (discussing THoMAs S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d
ed. 1970) and arguing that Ackerman's approach recapitulates the flaws of Kuhn's). The theory of
constitutional moments also bears a striking resemblance to the evolutionary model of punctuated
equilibrium in the natural sciences. According to that model, species remain stable for long periods of
time and then evolve rapidly in response to changes in their environment. See STEPHEN JAY GOULD,
EIGHT LITTLE PIGGms: REFLECTIONS INNATURAL HISTORY 277 (1993). Punctuated equilibrium explains
an otherwise troubling fact-the absence of intermediate forms in the fossil record. See id. (stating that
"if species tend to arise in a few thousand years and then persist unchanged for more than a million, we
will rarely find evidence for their momentary origin, and our fossil record will only tap the long periods
of prosperity and stability"). By contrast, Ackerman's theory of constitutional moments appears to
create at least as many puzzles as it solves. For example, once we abandon the requirement of a formal
amendment, how do we distinguish constitutional moments from ordinary politics? See Michael W.
McConnell, The Forgotten ConstitutionalMoment, 11 CONST. COMMENT. 115, 122-40 (1994) (arguing
that, according to Ackerman's criteria, the mid-1870s comprise a constitutional moment rejecting
Reconstruction's broad goals). Moreover, given the very large number of departures from the original
understanding, constitutional moments proliferate to the point where they are so numerous as to
overwhelm ordinary politics. See Tribe, supra note 49, at 1294-1303.
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the idea that the Constitution derives its legitimacy from historical acts of
consent by the People and must therefore be interpreted in accordance with the
discrete expressions of that consent.
Ironically, Ackerman's commitment to social-contractarianism leads him to
the uncontractarian concept of informal amendment. To enable open-ended
interpretation to coexist with careful preservation of discrete moments of higher
lawmaking, Ackerman must view what most of us would call ordinary politics
as a form of constitutional amendment. From a theoretical standpoint this might
be acceptable if one believed it possible to distinguish between ordinary politics
and higher lawmaking. To date, however, Ackerman has failed to provide
criteria for drawing this distinction with any precision. 8
More fundamentally, Ackerman's approach cannot reconcile social contract
theory with much of modem constitutional law because social contract theory-as
propounded by strict originalists as well as Ackerman-is backward-looking,
while much of modem constitutional law is forward-looking. The two landmark
cases Ackerman cites to illustrate his interpretive theory, Brown and Griswold,
in fact illustrate the theory's shortcomings.
First, consider Ackerman's explanation of Brown as a case of synthesizing the
Reconstruction Amendments and the informal amendment accomplished by the
New Deal. Ackerman begins by characterizing the Court's opinion in Plessy v.
Ferguson 79 as resting on a distinction between social classifications and legal
classifications as well as on a skepticism about the law's ability to affect social
change.80 Ackerman contends that the New Deal made the social/legal distinction untenable. 8' The informal amendment of the 1930s validated an activist
government empowered to right social wrongs and was predicated on the
recognition that the law plays a role in creating social wrongs. With institutions
like the public school thus transformed "[from constitutional anomaly to
constitutional paradigm," 82 the Brown Court, in Ackerman's view, recognized
that the badge of inferiority with which segregated public education branded
83
black children was attributable to the law.
Assume that Ackerman's synthetic account demonstrates that the New Deal
undermined the rationale given by the Plessy Court. Nonetheless, the account
hardly proves that Brown was correctly decided, especially if we begin with the
conventional view that the Framers and Ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment
understood most forms of de jure racial segregation as consistent with equal
protection. The doctrine of separate-but-equal need not rest on a social/legal

78. See Sherry, supra note 52, at 930 ("Ackerman never suggests any concrete alternative method of
demonstrating when the people have in fact signalled their considered judgment, other than the obstacle
course established by Article V or perhaps a national referendum .....
79. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
80. See AcKERMAN, supra note 13, at 146-47.
81. See id.

82. Id. at 149.
83. See id. at 150.
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distinction. It also may be justified by a particular substantive understanding of
the concept of equality. W.E.B. DuBois gave expression to such a conception in
his essay, Does the Negro Need Separate Schools?,84 and one hears echoes of
the position in some cultural feminist defenses of sex-segregated education.8 5
The existence of an activist government does not bear on the choice between
separatist and integrationist ideals of equality in any obvious fashion.
Moreover, to the extent Ackerman claims that the New Deal rendered the
public/private distinction untenable, his synthesis proves too much. The public/
86
private distinction continues to play a critical role in constitutional law.
Although one may justifiably criticize particular applications of that distinction, 87 some line must be drawn between harms attributable to the state and
harms characterized as private. Seen as an informal constitutional amendment,
the New Deal cannot supply concrete line-drawing criteria because the putative
informal amendment validated judicial deference to legislative and executive
action. Ackerman wishes to use the New Deal as the social-contractarian
warrant for judicially enforceable principles capable of trumping political divisions between public and private. However, Ackerman never confronts the fact
that the case which delivers the coup de grace to the Lochner era, West Coast
8 8 sounds in judicial restraint. 89
Hotel Co. v. Parrish,
Ackerman uses Griswold v. Connecticut as a second illustration of his
synthetic approach to interpretation. As Ackerman sees it, the Griswold Court
faced "a formidable problem. Given New Deal activism, what remained of the
Founding values of individual self-determination formerly expressed in the
language of property and contract?" 90 The Griswold Court solved the problem
by substituting heightened judicial protection of intimate association for the
Lochner era Court's protection of property and contract. 91

84. William E. B. DuBois, Does the Negro Need SeparateSchools?, 4 J. NEGRO EDUC. 328 (1935).
85. See Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex DiscriminationLaw: The Disaggregation
of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 84-85 (1995) (describing the litigation challenging the
male-only admissions policies of the Citadel and the Virginia Military Institute, in which the defendants
presented expert testimony relying upon the work of cultural feminist Carol Gilligan, notwithstanding
Gilligan's own objection to what she perceived as a misuse of her work).
86. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873 (1987) (noting and
criticizing the extent to which modem constitutional law treats so-called private harms as the product of
natural, presumably presocial ordering).
87. In my view, existing Supreme Court doctrine overstates the requirement that a state actor possess
an illicit motive, thereby ignoring structural harms. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of
Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189, 201 (1989) (finding that child abuse was not attributable to the state because
the state was merely "aware of the dangers [the plaintiff] faced in the free world"); Milliken v. Bradley,
418 U.S. 717, 744-45 (1974) (holding that federal district court lacked authority to order busing across school
district lines because the suburban school districts did not intentionally discriminate on the basis of race).
88. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
89. See id. at 398-99. As I discuss below, West Coast Hotel also rests on the lessons the Court drew
from the Great Depression. These lessons had very little to do with an informal amendment by the
People. See infra Part VI.
90. AcKERMAN,supra note 13, at 152.

91. See id. at 154-56.

1997]

NORMATIVE AND DESCRIPTIVE CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY

1783

Ackerman's account of Griswold is not so much wrong as it is incomplete. As
Ackerman himself acknowledges,9 2 the synthesis adopted by the Griswold
majority was not the only one available. The Griswold dissenters, for example,
saw the New Deal as affirming "the grant of an almost plenary power to the
activist state.", 93 Furthermore, one can readily identify other alternatives. Based
on Ackerman's treatment of Brown, for example, we might say that the New
Deal transformed our constitutional expectations from one involving a nightwatchman state to one involving a social-welfare state possessing affirmative
obligations. Under this view, there might be no constitutional right to labor for
less than the minimum wage and no constitutional right to use contraception,
but there would be a constitutional right to employment at a living wage.
Ackerman's theory of intergenerational synthesis is simply too thin to distinguish among these competing conceptions of intergenerational change. In cases
such as Brown and Griswold, Ackerman's theory perhaps shows that the results
reached by the Supreme Court, while inconsistent with strict originalism, do not
contradict the social-contractarian tenets of constitutional dualism. However, his
theory falls short of explaining why the particular solutions adopted in cases
such as Brown and Griswold are correct. To achieve this end would seem to
require that the synthetic approach to the social contract be supplemented by
other, nonoriginalist interpretive tools. 94 Like Monaghan, Ackerman presents a
social-contractarian account of constitutional interpretation, the very structure
95
of which suggests its own incompleteness.
B. FIDELITY AND CHANGE

Before exploring eclectic approaches to constitutional interpretation, we
should ask whether we can use Ackerman's theory as a starting point in building
a coherent open-ended approach that preserves the chief advances his theory
makes over strict originalism. Lawrence Lessig has undertaken the most ambitious-and to my mind, the most successful-attempt along these lines.9 6
According to Lessig, Ackerman mistakenly assumes that unless an earlier
reading of the Constitution was incorrect, a changed reading will be justified

92. See id. at 157-58.
93. Id.
94. In Griswold, for example, the Court synthesizes a textual commitment to various liberties, a
doctrinal presumption of noninterference with the political process, and a normative conception of the
value of intimate association. The historical commitments of the People appear to play no significant
role, which is not surprising given that the People did not self-consciously place laws governing sexual
intimacy and procreation beyond the realm of ordinary politics during a Constitutional moment
preceding Griswold.
95. Ackerman appears to acknowledge the limitations of his theory as thus far presented. See
AcKERMAN, supra note 13, at 159 ("I hope I have said enough to suggest my larger ambition-to define
a model of interpretation which can do justice to the complexity of American judicial practice."). He
promises to provide a more complete picture in a later volume. See id. at 162.
96. See Lawrence Lessig, UnderstandingChangedReadings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REv.
395 (1995).
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only if there has been an amendment.97 Lessig posits that preserving the
Constitution's meaning from one period to another will sometimes require that a
text which was read to say one thing at one time should be read to say
something else at a later time. To use one of Lessig's examples, although in the
eighteenth century it would have been reasonable (within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment) to detain an arrestee for six hours while transporting him
thirty miles on horseback, a six-hour delay for the same purpose would be
unreasonable given modem means of transportation.9 8 As Lessig explains,
fidelity to the original meaning will sometimes require that a court give an
unchanged text a changed reading in light of changed circumstances. 99
According to Lessig, technological advances do not constitute the only way
in which an interpretive context may change. Along with Ackerman, he accepts
that one must synthesize portions of the Constitution enacted at different times
in order to make sense of the entire document. 1°° As a general matter, interpretation requires translation when assumptions that were once taken for granted are
challenged, or when formerly contested issues become settled. Lessig characterizes such changes as involving "contested" and "uncontested" discourses.' 1
Most of the examples that Lessig provides involve social changes largely
external to the law. 102 More controversially, Lessig also argues that a change in
the prevailing understandings about the law itself can constitute the kind of
changed context that justifies a changed reading. 10 3 His paradigm is the Supreme Court's changed interpretation of the Rules of Decision Act in Erie
Railroad v. Tompkins. 1 Lessig argues that the legal realist critique of the view
that common-law judges "find" rather than "make" law rendered the old
regime of Swift v. Tyson 10 5-which rested on the premise that state high court
common law decisions "are, at most, only evidence of what the laws are; and
6
are not of themselves laws" 'o -increasingly untenable. 107
Although Erie involved a changed reading of a statute, Lessig applies his
theory of the "Erie effect" to changes in constitutional readings as well. With
the success of legal realism and related movements, the legal community
increasingly viewed interpretive activities that were formerly assumed to be
97. See id. at 400.
98. See id. at 397-98.
99. See id. at 402-03.
100. See id. at 407-10.
101. See id. at 410-14.
102. See id. at 415-19 (discussing moral and scientific attitudes towards homosexuality); id. at
419-23 (discussing economic theory); id. at 423-26 (discussing social and scientific attitudes towards
race).
103. See id. at 426-37.
104. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
105. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
106. Id. at 18.
107. See Lessig, supra note 96, at 426-32. In my view, Lessig overstates the role of legal realism in
the Erie decision. See Michael C. Dorf, Predictionand the Rule of Law, 42 UCLA L. REV. 651, 707-09
(1995) (arguing that federalism provides a better account of Erie).
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legal and objective as political and subjective. The courts responded by allocating decisionmaking authority to politically accountable institutions. °8 The
repudiation of Lochner provides the classic example of such an allocation."o In
Lessig's view, the change in the prevailing understanding justified the changed
readings because "the author [of the legal texts under construction] did not
choose or argue over or resolve any conflicts about matters within an uncon0
tested discourse." "1
Notice that Lessig, like Ackerman, defends his view of an evolving Constitution in starkly intentionalist terms. Change is permissible, but only because it
preserves the translated intentions of the authors. In dispensing with the deus ex
machina of informal constitutional amendments, Lessig's theory seems more
conventional than Ackerman's. But in placing fidelity at the center of a dynamic
model, Lessig's theory also encounters two important difficulties.
First, the Erie effect can be problematic on its own terms. The idea that the
shift from an uncontested discourse to a contested one (or to a different
contested discourse) authorizes the modem interpreter to depart from the original reading will sometimes provide a license to ignore the text rather than to
interpret it. Consider an example Laurence Tribe and I have given:
[C]ontrary to legal realist theory, the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause
presupposes that property can be prepolitical ....

If, as the legal realists

argued, property were only the sum total of legislative entitlements, then it
could never be "taken" because, by definition, that which the legislature
declares no longer to be yours would not qualify as private property in the
first place. 1 1'

How would the Takings Clause fare under Lessig's approach? If we accept that
the Takings Clause assumes a prepolitical conception of property that is now
contested (or worse, completely rejected) by legal realism, the Erie effect allows
courts to ignore the Takings Clause without contradicting the intent of its
authors. Yet this seems to go too far. Surely the Takings Clause has some effect.
Modem conditions may lead us to take a different approach to some problems
from that of the Founding generation, but that is very different from saying that
2
modem conditions justify ignoring the text completely."i
108. See Lessig, supra note 96, at 438.
109. See id. at 443-72.
110. Id. at 440.
111. TRIBE & DoRF, supra note 26, at 70. Of course, well before legal realism, jurists held a
positivist view of the particular property rules in any jurisdiction. See Christopher L. Eisgruber, Dred
Again: Oiginalism's Forgotten Past, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 37, 44 (1993) (describing the views of
Joseph Story).
112. The Takings Clause was originally understood to apply to appropriations but not to regulations.
See William M. Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the PoliticalProcess,
95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 782 (1995). Lessig admires Treanor's history and approves in principle of his
efforts to translate that history, see Lawrence Lessig, Reading the Constitution in Cyberspace, 45
EMORY L.J. 869, 902 n.93 (1996), but questions whether the translation can be rendered sufficiently
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The second difficulty with Lessig's approach is external. Like Ackerman's
theory of intergenerational synthesis, Lessig's fidelity theory fails to account for
much of modem constitutional law. Lessig illustrates how his approach works
by considering the Supreme Court's acquiescence to the New Deal during the
1930s. 13 Significantly, the shift Lessig describes is a judicial retreat. By the
beginning of the 1940s, the Court had abandoned its restrictive interpretation of
the Commerce Clause and its expansive interpretation of property and of liberty
of contract under the Due Process Clauses." 4 In Lessig's account, the Court's
earlier assumptions had become part of a contested discourse, and thus deference to the political branches constituted an appropriate response. But Lessig's
theory does not provide an explanation for the Court's continued active role in
reviewing legislation that infringes upon various individual rights.
Perhaps this is deliberate. Perhaps Lessig believes that the Court's modem
jurisprudence of unenumerated rights cannot be justified in terms of fidelity and
is therefore illegitimate. But this answer will not suffice because we now have a
contested discourse about enumerated rights as well as unenumerated ones. The
right not to have property taken without just compensation is one such right.
The right to racist speech is another.1 5 Lessig's theory would apparently
authorize deference to elected bodies even in these areas. Lessig's powerful
explanation of deference to elected bodies is only part of the story of modem
constitutional law. To account for the remainder would 16require that fidelity
theory be supplemented with other interpretive principles.'
nonpolitical to justify judicial action. See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint,65 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1365, 1383-84 (1997). A more conventional approach would search for core values protected by
the Takings Clause that continue to warrant protection in the modem age. See, e.g., William K. Jones,
Confiscation: A Rationale of the Law of Takings, 24 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1, 4-5 (1995) (identifying
alleviation of property owners' insecurity, promotion of private investment, and encouragement of
government fiscal responsibility as purposes of the Takings Clause).
113. See Lessig, supra note 96, at 443-72.
114. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 125 (1941) (sustaining Congress's power under
the Commerce Clause to establish minimum wages, maximum hours, and overtime compensation rules
for workers producing goods for interstate commerce); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S.
144, 148 (1938) (discussing the presumption of constitutionality of economic legislation challenged
under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments).
115. Compare R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul., 505 U.S. 377, 382-90 (1992) (holding that municipality
may not prohibit a discriminatory subset of otherwise proscribable fighting words) with id. at 397-411
(White, J., joined by Blackmun, O'Connor, & Stevens (in part), concurring in the judgment) (contesting
the majority's principal argument). See generally Charles R. Lawrence H, If He Hollers Let Him Go:
Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DuKE L.J. 431 (arguing that the distinction between hate
speech and fighting words is false).
116. Lessig has recently advanced a translation-based theory that would distinguish between rights
provisions and other provisions. He argues that in structural cases such as Erie (which involves the
structural principle of federalism), the default setting is state power, so that a shift to a contested
discourse leads to deference to such power. By contrast, because rights function as trumps, the
government must advance a reason to override a right, so the default position favors the individual;
thus, a shift to a contested discourse will displace government power. See Lessig, supra note 112, at
1414. This suggestion seems too clever by half. In rights cases, the default is set against government
power only after a right is found. Yet in the most controversial cases, the very question is whether there
is a right. Unless there is a general right to liberty (which, constitutionally speaking, there is not),
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Ultimately, Lessig fails to account for much of modem constitutional law in
terms of fidelity for the simple reason that much modem constitutional law is
not faithful to the intent of the Framers. The most that Lessig can do is show
that some modem constitutional decisions do not contradict a suitably translated
version of the Framers' intentions. He cannot show, however, that the decisions
derive from those intentions.
Although both Ackerman and Lessig present sophisticated refinements of
originalism, neither provides a satisfactory explanation of modem constitutional
law."1 7 This is hardly surprising because modem constitutional law is only
partly based on the sorts of social-contractarian premises from which both
Ackerman and Lessig begin." 8
IV ECLECTICISM

The theories examined thus far raise but do not answer the question of how to
justify the nonoriginalist interpretive techniques that play a major role in
modem constitutional interpretation. In answering this question, perhaps one
might construct a theory based on multiple sources of legitimacy-along the
lines suggested by Monaghan. Because multiple sources will sometimes give
rise to conflicting and incommensurate arguments, such an eclectic theory
would appear to require some metaprinciple that mediates among conflicts
between different kinds of arguments." 9
Anyone familiar with the workings of constitutional law as practiced by the
Supreme Court will recognize an immediate difficulty in locating a suitable
metaprinciple: Depending on the context, the Court will sometimes favor one
form of argument, but at other times favor others. As a consequence, any
metaprinciple likely will be descriptively inaccurate. Putting the matter somewhat differently, adherence to any a priori sensible metaprinciple will require
the overruling of a good deal of existing case law. Largely for this reason, a
number of important constitutional scholars such as Laurence Tribe characterize
120
the quest for a metaprinciple as a vain one.

the mere assertion of a constitutional right should not alter the default. Discerning whether a right exists
in the first place would still seem to require a thicker normative theory than Lessig provides.
117. I do not contend that it is logically impossible to construct a descriptively accurate account of
constitutional law that begins from modified contractarian premises. For an example of another
interesting effort along these lines, see Jed Rubenfeld, Reading the Constitution as Spoken, 104 YALE
L.J. 1119, 1143-63 (1995) (substituting the idea of a commitment over an extended period of time for
that of consent at a particular moment).
118. See Monaghan, supra note 10, at 727-39 (arguing that in the areas of civil liberties, equal
protection, federalism, separation of powers, and the scope of presidential power, the Court has either
initiated or acquiesced in broad departures from the original understanding).
119. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 16 (arguing that the apparent incommensurability of different
forms of constitutional argument can often be overcome by the interpreter's recognition that the forms
often overlap and proposing a hierarchy of text over Framers' intent, over constitutional theory, over
precedent, over value, for those cases in which conflict is unavoidable).
120. Tribe organizes his account of constitutional law into seven models, each corresponding in part
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A. THE RESORT TO DESCRIPTION

Going beyond the claim that no metaprinciple will work in practice, Philip
Bobbitt argues that the quest for a metaprinciple-or, as he calls it, an algorithm-is ill-conceived on more basic grounds. According to Bobbitt, the search
for a constitutional decisionmaking algorithm rests on the false assumption that
constitutional law needs to be legitimated by reference to an external standard.
Instead, he argues, use of the various forms of constitutional argumentmodalities in Bobbitt's terminology-maintains the legitimacy of the constitutional system.1 2 1 Bobbitt identifies textual, doctrinal, historical, ethical, and
prudential arguments as distinct modalities.1 22 Any algorithm will either elevate
one of the modalities above the others or create a new metamodality, and in
23
either case we will be left with the question of what legitimates that choice. 1
The efforts at external legitimation result in either an infinite regress or in
circular argument. Bobbitt would have us recognize that within constitutional
law there is no way to legitimate the modalities.
Bobbitt's account of constitutional law is subtle and insightful. As a matter of
description, his typology 24 provides a useful tool for analyzing constitutional
questions. 25 But does it do more? Bobbitt would answer that this question is
to an historical era, but each also present to some degree today. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONsTrrurnONAL LAW § 1-1, at 1-2 (2d ed. 1988). He states: "How much can be gained by seeking any
single, unitary theory for construing the Constitution is unclear. It may be that all efforts at such
reduction or simplification, however suggestive, are ultimately more misleading than informative." Id.
at 1. See also Laurence H. Tribe, Comment in SCALIA, supra note 2, at 73 (declining the invitation to
"roll [his] legal universe into a ball and toss it into the ring as [a] candidate for what the final rules of
the interpretive game must be").
Fallon refers to Tribe and Stanley Fish as "open-system" theorists because they eschew "claims that
there are generally applicable rules or even articulable principles for weighing or combining constitutional arguments of different kinds." Fallon, supra note 16, at 1224. In this respect, Tribe and Fish
make the same point as Philip Bobbitt, whose work I discuss below, even though Bobbitt distinguishes
his position from Fish's. See BoBBrrr, supra note 15, at 38-42. Curiously, something about Stanley
Fish's views inspires other scholars to assert that at an important level he really agrees with his
disputants. See generally Dennis Patterson, The Poverty of Interpretive Universalism: Toward the
Reconstruction of Legal Theory, 72 TEx. L. REv. 1, 2-7 (1993) (arguing that Fish and Ronald Dworkin
share the view that meaning consists of the application of an interpretive framework); Stanley Fish,
How Come You Do Me Like You Do? A Response to Dennis Patterson, 72 TEX. L. REv. 57 (1993)
(arguing that Patterson has misread his work); Dennis Patterson, You Made Me Do It: My Reply to
Stanley Fish, 72 Tx. L. REV. 67 (1993) (arguing that Fish has misunderstood his own thought).
121. See BOBBrrr, supra note 15, at 8-9.
122. See id. at 11-22.
123. See id. at 131-54.
124. Bobbitt first set forth the typology in Philip Bobbitt, ConstitutionalFate, 58 TEx. L. REV. 695
(1980). Other scholars classify the forms of constitutional argument somewhat differently. See CHARLES
A. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY 15-28 (1969) (discussing text, doctrine,
precedent, social evidence, and history); Fallon, supra note 16; Griffin, supra note 14, at 1762-67
(comparing Bobbitt's typology with those of Robert Post and Richard Fallon and discussing Robert
Post, Theories of ConstitutionalInterpretation,30 REPRESENTATIONS 13 (1990)).
125. For example, in the middle Section of ConstitutionalInterpretation,Bobbitt uses the modalities
to shed considerable light on a judicial opinion, (Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 346 (1920)), an
executive branch scandal, (the Iran-Contra affair), and a Senate decision (the rejection of President
Reagan's nomination of Robert Bork for the Supreme Court). See BoBBrrr, supra note 15, at 45-108.
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misguided.1 26 Exhibiting Wittgenstein's emphasis on practice, 12 7 he states that

"[law is something we do, not something we have as a consequence of
29
something we do."' 2 8 He rejects "an external legitimating criterion for law" 1
and sees his work as shifting from the subject of truth to that of meaning. 130 In
prosaic terms, Bobbitt views jurisprudence as properly focusing on description
rather than justification.
Bobbitt's approach eliminates the gap between normative and descriptive
accounts of constitutional law by simply denying the utility of a normative
account.13 ' This is not to say that normative arguments play no role in Bobbitt's
descriptive project. Indeed, Bobbitt devotes much of his first major work,
Constitutional Fate, 3 2 to showing that "ethical argument"-by which he

means arguments rooted in the American ethos of limited governmentconstitutes a modality of our existing constitutional discourse. 133 Bobbitt's
approach is antinormative in the sense that he disapproves of claims that
constitutional interpretation ought to proceed in one fashion or another.
Bobbitt's refusal to provide an account that justifies constitutional interpretation renders his descriptive account inaccurate for the following reason: the
process of justification is itself internal to constitutional interpretation. Justifica126. Accord Griffin, supra note 14, at 1766 ("What theory could possibly provide a persuasive and
coherent rationale for the entire body of American constitutional law as well as provide persuasive
guidance for all future cases?").
127. See George A. Martinez, The New Wittgensteinians and the End of Jurisprudence,29 Loy. L.A.
L. REV. 545, 548-56 (1996) (describing Bobbitt as the leading neo-Wittgensteinian legal scholar).
128. See BOBBITr, supra note 15, at 24.
129. Philip Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics,72 TEx. L. REv. 1869, 1886 (1994).
130. See id. at 1885. The question of whether this is an appropriate approach to jurisprudence has
inspired some heated, indeed sometimes nasty, debate. For the most spirited attacks, see generally Mark
Tushnet, Justification in ConstitutionalAdjudication: A Comment on ConstitutionalInterpretation,72
TEx. L. REv. 1707 (1994); Steven L. Winter, The Constitution of Conscience, 72 TEx. L. REV. 1805
(1994). For the most spirited defense, see generally Dennis Patterson, Wittgenstein and Constitutional
Theory, 72 Thx. L. REV. 1837 (1994) (critiquing Winter). For the next round, see Bobbitt, supra note
129, at 1904-10, 1940-61 (responding to Winter); Steven L. Winter, One Size Fits All, 72 Thx. L. REV.
1857 (1994) (responding to Patterson).
131. Of course Bobbitt accepts that constitutional theory must be normative in the sense that it must
account for law's force, and its insistence on legal norms. See BOBBirr, supra note 15, at 39-40. Bobbitt
rejects accounts that are normative as opposed to descriptive. Cf Bobbitt, supra note 129, at 1908-09
(discussing "normative" critiques in this second sense).
132. See PHILIP BOBBIT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 93-167 (1982).
133. In this respect, Bobbitt's approach resembles what Ronald Dworkin terms the "moral reading
of the Constitution." See RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN

CONSTITUTION 1-38 (1996). For Dworkin, as for Bobbitt, moral arguments play a role, but not
necessarily the dominant role, in constitutional interpretation. Moral principles must fit with "language,
precedent, and practice[,]" although in hard cases "thoughtful judges must ... decide on their own
which conception does most credit to the nation." Ronald Dworkin, The Moral Reading of the
Constitution, N.Y. REv. OF BOOKS, Mar. 21, 1996, at 46, 48. Bobbitt would give somewhat less scope to
moral argument as such, distinguishing between moral arguments generally-which Bobbitt deems
prudential-and "ethical arguments"-which Bobbitt sees as more closely tied to the Constitution. See
BOBBrir, supra note 15, at 138. I discuss the relation between Bobbitt's modalities and Dworkin's
account of integrity in Michael C. Dorf, Truth, Justice, and the American Constitution, 97 COLUM. L.
REv. 133, 147-52 (1997).
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tion may not be a modality in the sense in which Bobbitt uses the term, but
Supreme Court opinions abound with self-conscious justifications of the modalities the Court employs.' 34 To describe constitutional law accurately thus requires an account of justification.
Nevertheless, Bobbitt provides an interesting and sophisticated argument in
support of his claim that accounts which seek to justify constitutional interpretation are fundamentally misguided. To understand the argument's limitations
requires that we engage it in some detail, however. To that end, consider how
Bobbitt might respond to critiques of his arguments based on various socialcontractarian premises.
From the perspective of the strict originalist, Bobbitt's rejection of an external source of legitimacy will appear unconvincing. Bobbitt argues that all quests
for external sources of legitimacy either privilege a single modality or create a
new one, which must itself then be legitimated. 135 The strict originalist will
likely agree as a descriptive matter-strict originalism does privilege the historical modality-but will not see this as a flaw in her theory. The strict originalist
will say that it is no answer to the charge that modem departure from original
meaning debases constitutional law to respond-as Bobbitt apparently does-by
saying that this is simply the way things are. So much the worse for the present,
the strict originalist will say.
Alternatively, the originalist might respond to Bobbitt's resort to description
by arguing that, contrary to Bobbitt's claim otherwise, Bobbitt himself endorses
a metaprinciple: the one that says correct use136 of the existing modalities
renders constitutional argument legitimate. To be sure, this view does not
qualify as a metarule in the sense that Bobbitt uses the term; it does not attempt
to resolve intermodal conflict. But it qualifies as a metarule in the sense that it is
Bobbitt's reason for believing that correct use of the modalities is the touchstone of legitimate constitutional argument.
Moreover, the strict originalist will keep pushing. "Why are the existing
modalities the right way to go about making legitimate constitutional arguments?" we can hear her ask. Again, Bobbitt denies the coherence of the
question. From his perspective, the question makes as little sense as asking why
the rules of English require that plural nouns take plural verbs. Those are simply

134. Indeed, in important cases, the legitimacy of the Court's decision is typically the central issue.
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865-69 (1992) (discussing the Court's legitimacy
and stare decisis); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986) (discussing the legitimacy of judicial
discovery of unenumerated constitutional rights); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176-78
(1803) (discussing the legitimacy of judicial review).
135. See BoBBrrr, supra note 15, at 122-40, 155-56.
136. By "correct use" I mean what Bobbitt means, namely arguments within the boundaries of
acceptability regardless of the particular result at which they arrive. See id. at 177. To use an analogy
proposed by Bobbitt and developed by Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson, an argument correctly using
the modalities is legitimate, regardless of the result urged, in the way that a sentence is grammatical,
regardless of the meaning of the sentence. See J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Constitutional
Grammar,72 Tx. L. REv. 1771, 1775 (1994).
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the rules of the game; if you do not abide by them, you are playing a different
game.
At this point the strict originalist may become exasperated. She will argue
that Bobbitt is being pedantic. The originalist could invoke the following
analogy: When baseball's American League adopted the designated-hitter rule,
it changed the rules of the game. However, only an extreme purist would say
that it abolished baseball. Just as fans of the game of baseball may profitably
debate whether the change improved the game, so constitutional scholars,
judges, lawyers, and others may sensibly argue over whether constitutional law
would be improved if strict originalism were to replace the multiple modalities.
In the end, Bobbitt acknowledges this challenge. He admits that if it could be
shown that the existing system could be made more just, that showing would
count as a convincing argument for reform. 137 But Bobbitt includes an important caveat: the burden of proof lies with those who would change the existing
system, and that burden requires more than merely hypothesizing some more
just ideal system. The burden of proof requires making concrete the transition
from here to there in the actual world. 13 8 Bobbitt goes on to argue that neither
originalism nor any other proposed
single-modality interpretive method would
139
make the system more just.
Bobbitt thus appears to give two very different answers to the originalist
critic. On the one hand, he tells the originalist that her views about legitimacy
are simply mistaken as a matter of understanding the nature of constitutional
argument. On the other hand, Bobbitt seems to accept the possibility that the
system could change, but counters that the change would not be an improvement. Bobbitt thus makes both an a priori claim that constitutional law cannot
be originalist and a consequentialist claim that (even if it could be) it should not
be originalist.
Given that Bobbitt understands how to defeat the originalist objection in
consequentialist terms, how can he also maintain that the objection is illformed? As I read Bobbitt, the originalist objection is not really a priori
incomprehensible; rather, it is such an extreme version of a comprehensible
objection that it becomes incomprehensible. Return to the baseball analogy. As
noted, one could debate whether adding a designated hitter, or permitting night
games at Wrigley Field in Chicago, changed the game for better or for worse,
while still understanding that with or without either change, the game played
still would be baseball. But if someone were to propose that baseball would be
"improved" if it were replaced by soccer, we would say that the change is so
140
radical that it no longer makes sense to talk of the resulting game as baseball.
Similarly, I read Bobbitt to say that all single-modality theories of constitutional

137.
138.
139.
140.

See BOBBrrr, supra note 15, at 170.
See id. at 170, 176-77.
See id. at 171-86.
Cf. TRIBE & DoRF, supra note 26, at 112-14 (discussing essential aspects of judicial decisions).
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law depart so far from what the relevant audience understands that subject to be
that they cannot meaningfully be called theories of constitutional law.
The response Bobbitt would give to the strict originalist's critique may be
convincing on its own terms, but it does not adequately address more subtle
critiques, as we can see by contrasting Bobbitt's views with Monaghan's.
Monaghan begins with the premise that constitutional law derives its legitimacy
from the account of popular sovereignty given by strict originalism. Pragmatic
considerations lead him to conclude that another factor-the stability that
comes from respecting important precedents-also bestows legitimacy on our
constitutional order. 14 Notice that Monaghan does not content himself with
describing the role stare decisis plays in constitutional adjudication; he seeks to
justify that role. Having done so, he ends with a question: might other instrumental modes of interpretation also bestow legitimacy on the constitutional order,
and if so, how so? For Bobbitt, by contrast, reliance on stare decisis (or, as he
would call it, reasoning in the doctrinal modality) does not need to be legitimated. Recognizing that precedential argument is a modality disclaims a need
for external legitimation.
Monaghan's ultimate question points out the limitations of Bobbitt's approach, as we can see by translating the question into Bobbitt's own vocabulary.
Monaghan asks how we can justify the particular modalities currently employed
by constitutional interpreters. Recall that Bobbitt gives two answers. First, he
argues that this question misconceives the nature of modal reasoning. Second,
he suggests that the existing modalities enable justice. As we shall see, neither
answer adequately addresses the question.
First, as the baseball example illustrates, Bobbitt's analytical claim only
disposes of conceptions so radically divergent from existing constitutional
practice that they cannot be taken seriously as conceptions of that practice.
Bobbitt primarily targets single-modality theories. 14 2 Yet Monaghan does not
seek a justification for a single-modality theory. Quite to the contrary, he seeks
to justify an account of constitutional law that allows for text, original meaning,
precedent, morality, and perhaps other modes of interpretation. Moreover,
Monaghan does not suggest that each of these modalities must be justified by
reference to a single overarching modality (or algorithm). Like Bobbitt, Monaghan is eclectic, but unlike Bobbitt, he feels14 3some need to explain why the
particular modalities we use are the right ones.
141. See Monaghan, supra note 10, at 724.
142. See BOBBrrr, supra note 15, at 126-40 (criticizing Mark Tushnet's approach, which Bobbitt
deems prudentialist).
143. I am somewhat reluctant to say that Bobbitt feels no need to justify the particular extant
modalities. In first introducing his typology, Bobbitt gave a brief explanation of how each modality
attains legitimacy. See Bobbitt, supra note 124, at 700-25. By contrast, Constitutional Interpretation
describes how each modality functions but studiously avoids explaining why each might be considered
legitimate. See BoBBrrr, supra note 15, at 13-22. Indeed, Bobbitt argues in ConstitutionalInterpretation that a modality can only be justified in a circular manner. See id. at 25-27. I take the position stated
in ConstitutionalInterpretationto express Bobbitt's considered view.
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Bobbitt's second argument against the need for justification also fails to
dispose of Monaghan's question. Bobbitt argues that the very incommensurability of the modalities-the fact that they do not invariably produce a unique
decision--enables justice because the indeterminacy enables the exercise of
conscience by the judge.' 44 This is a bold and original suggestion, but it does
not dispatch all approaches that seek instrumental justifications of the modalities actually used by courts. Bobbitt's argument merely shows that indeterminacy of some sort enables the exercise of judicial conscience. But there are
many ways in which a decisionmaking system can be indeterminate. Why
should we be happy with the particular kind of indeterminacy produced by the
existing modalities? The question matters because modalities that operate differently from the way in which the existing ones operate will enable judicial
conscience in a different way.
Accepting Bobbitt's view that no single algorithm exists only tells us that we
should not look for a single unifying justification for the modalities. It does not
tell us that we should not look for justifications of each of the modalities.
Consider the following illustration. Suppose that the most accurate account of
the Supreme Court's practice led to the conclusion that the prudential modality
is a mode of reasoning in which one seeks rules of law to maximize the welfare
of white Protestant males. In such a world, Bobbitt could make all of the same
arguments that he makes in our world. 145 What might he say to a critic who
charged that this prudential principle is substantively unjust because it facilitates the exercise of judicial conscience in a pernicious direction? That the critic
mistakenly seeks a single-modality explanation? This is not true; she merely
claims that one of the modalities should be altered. That the existing modalities
enable conscience? But the critic will propose alternative modalities that also
facilitate conscience, and a more just version of conscience at that.
Bobbitt rightly identifies the eclectic character of constitutional interpretation.
But his account of constitutional law is incomplete. A shift from a singlemodality account implies a shift from a single source of legitimacy to multiple
sources of legitimacy. It does not guarantee that the existing eclectic order,
whatever its content, is legitimate.
To be convincing, Bobbitt's constitutionalism seems to require precisely what
144. See BOBBrrr, supra note 15, at 178-86. Insofar as conscience is personal, this answer will not
satisfy the originalist, who typically subscribes to originalism precisely as a means of avoiding
decisions according to individual (unelected) consciences. See Antonin Scalia, Originalism:The Lesser
Evil, 57 U. CtN. L. REv. 849, 854 (1989). Indeed, even nonoriginalists may be troubled by Bobbitt's
reliance on personal moral sensibilities. See DENNis PATTERSON, LAW AND ThtuH 143-49 (1996). Yet
viewed in a different light, conscience is not necessarily idiosyncratic. As Jefferson Powell notes,
Bobbitt's work implicitly suggests that the very practice of using the modalities skillfully will mold the
decisionmaker's conscience. See H. Jefferson Powell, ConstitutionalInvestigations, 72 TEx. L. REv.
1731, 1749-50 (1994).
145. Indeed, some have argued that this is our world. See, e.g., Martinez, supra note 127, at 568-69
(stating that Bobbitt's approach does not address "the problem of bad coherence"); Margaret J. Radin,
The Pragmatistand the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1699, 1710 (1990) (observing that legal systems
may be both coherent and sexist or racist).
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he rejects: some justification for each of the particular modalities and some
account of how the modalities interact. 1 46 Without such a justification, his
description is, in the end, only a description. It closes the descriptive/normative
gap by fiat.
B. THE PERILS OF ECLECTICISM

Eclectics believe that constitutional interpretation derives its legitimacy from
a variety of sources. Our constitutional practices require interpreters to look to
text, structure, history, precedent, and morality. What does the judge do when
these sources point in conflicting directions? According to Bobbitt, she resorts
to conscience. 147 For those who find this answer unacceptable, eclecticism
appears to pose an incommensurability problem.
Consider one approach to the incommensurability dilemma. Richard Fallon
argues that most cases raise no issue of incommensurability, because the forms
of constitutional argument are interrelated. 48 For example, arguments about
precedent incorporate earlier arguments about text, structure, history, and morality. Similarly, moral arguments take other forms of argument as starting points.
In short, the most effective constitutional arguments use the various forms to
generate a complete overall picture. The typology of constitutional argument is
useful in the way that studying various body parts is useful: One may profitably
study the liver, the pancreas, the heart, and the brain as independent entities, but
in the end, none can function except as part of the whole organism. 149
Nevertheless, sometimes irreducible conflict among different forms of argument will exist. Fallon proposes a hierarchy for such situations. In descending
order of priority come arguments from: (1) text, (2) historical intent, (3) theory,
(4) precedent, and (5) value. 150 In my view, the hierarchy cannot succeed
because there inevitably will be cases in which an argument on a lower rung
legitimately trumps one on a higher rung. But unlike Bobbitt, I do not believe
that the impossibility of a hierarchy justifies a self-conscious resort to the
private mechanism of conscience.
As Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson have noted, intermodal conflict is no
more inherently troubling than intramodal conflict. 5'' Nor does it present a
greater incommensurability problem. For example, within the prudential modal146. As Mark Tushnet observes, despite Bobbitt's occasional insistence that each constitutional
decision employs one or another modality depending on the context, Bobbitt elsewhere seemingly
approves of the simultaneous use of multiple modalities. See Tushnet, supra note 130, at 1725 n.106
(1994).
147. See BOBBn-r, supra note 15, at 178-86.
148. See Fallon, supra note 16, at 1237-42.
149. Cf. Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and Constitutional Ethics, 82 MICH. L. REv. 665, 668
(1984) (reviewing PHnin BOBBrrr, CONsTrrUTnONAL FATE (1982), and contending that Bobbitt artificially distinguishes the modalities).
150. See Fallon, supra note 16, at 1244-46.
151. See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 136, at 1796-1801 (arguing that Bobbitt does not provide an
adequate account of intramodal conflict).
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ity, judges must typically weigh incommensurate costs and benefits. Within the
historical modality, we sometimes find that Hamilton thought one thing and
Madison thought something else. Yet we do not ordinarily believe that such
circumstances require us to choose an all-purpose approach to moral questions
or to establish general criteria for preferring one Framer over another. Neither
legal reasoning in general nor constitutional law in particular works in this way.
Instead, judges make concrete, contextualized judgments. 152 To be sure, they try
to do so in a principled way. But surely Bobbitt is correct that the search for a
single, over-arching principle of interpretation is misguided. Thus, incommensurability does not constitute a fatal flaw of eclecticism.
Nevertheless, a different kind of inconsistency plagues eclecticism. Although
the various mechanisms each modality uses for producing meaning can usually
be harmonized, the conventional justification for relying on original meaning
appears inconsistent with the justification for the others. The social-contractarian claim that adherence to the intent of the Adopters confers legitimacy is also
a claim that deviation from the Adopters' intent destroys legitimacy.
To be sure, if one takes the view that nonoriginalist sources only become
relevant to constitutional interpretation when original meaning leaves ambiguity,1 5 3 then no conflict exists. Under such a view, value arguments play only a
gap-filling role necessitated by originalism's limitations. But nonoriginalist
sources appear to play a larger role in constitutional jurisprudence as well as
eclectic constitutional theory-sometimes trumping a relatively clear original
understanding. 154 The indeterminacy of originalism cannot account descriptively for this feature of the existing constitutional order.
If we seek a justification for each of the modalities, we must squarely
confront the challenge of originalism. Strict originalism is incompatible with
eclecticism (and thus with the modem constitutional order) because the strict
originalist denies the legitimacy of nonoriginalist arguments.
A less strict form of originalism may at first appear to fare better, but here too
problems emerge. What does it mean to say that other factors outweigh even a
clearly contrary original understanding? No doubt it means that, all things
considered, giving greater weight to the nonoriginalist sources will advance
important constitutional values to a greater extent than would permitting the
original understanding to prevail. But if such consequentialist determinations
can ever trump original understanding, why should they not always trump
original understanding?
Thus, we have come full circle from Monaghan's puzzle. For Monaghan, the
need for a consequentialist account of stare decisis opens the door to other,
nonoriginalist sources. If we accept the legitimacy of these other sources in
152. See Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARv. L. REv. 741, 746-48 (1993).
153. This appears to be Brest's definition of moderate originalism. See Brest, supra note 1, at 229.
154. See DWORKIN, supra note 133, passim (arguing that American constitutionalism includes a
thorough and longstanding commitment to treating constitutional provisions as moral principles that
often contravene the Framers' concrete expectations).
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consequentialist terms, however, why should we give original meaning any
weight at all? In an eclectic world, the social-contractarian pedigree of original
meaning does not enable it to ride for free. Like the other sources of constitutional meaning, it too must be justified in consequentialist terms. 155 I now turn
to the question of whether this can be done without undermining
the legitimacy
56
1
argument.
constitutional
of
forms
nonoriginalist
of other,
V.

TEXT, CONTEXT, AND ORIGINAL MEANING

The question of why the Constitution, largely written by generations long
dead, should bind us today, is a hotly contested question of political theory.
Originalists propose one answer: The Constitution binds us because it was
adopted by the People. In the introduction, I proposed a different answer: The
Constitution binds us because the overwhelming proportion of the population
accepts that it does. 15 7 One can readily imagine other answers. Following
Edmund Burke, for example, we might locate the Constitution's authority in a
view about the organic nature of society over time. 158 Or we might suppose that
159
the Constitution binds us because it embodies substantively just principles.
But whatever disagreement exists over the source of the Constitution's status as
law, little disagreement exists over the fact that it is law. And whatever
disagreement exists over what comprises "the Constitution," very little disagree155. One can readily anticipate Bobbit's objection that by seeking an instrumental justification of
the various modalities, we elevate the prudential modality above all others. Indeed, he levels this very
charge at Mark Tushnet. See BOBBrrr, supra note 15, at 126-40 (discussing MARK TUSHNET, RED,
WHITE AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1988)). As noted above, Bobbitt's
stance overlooks the important role that justificatory arguments play within constitutional law.
156. The conventional justifications for the other, nonoriginalist, modalities might be inconsistent
with one another as well. For example, textualism could be justified in terms of original intent, see
Brest, supra note 1, at 208-09, or in terms of the value served by allowing the public to know the law.
See BOBBITr, supra note 15, at 25-27. Either justification could be seen as inconsistent with one
conventional justification for normative argument in constitutional interpretation-namely, to make the
Constitution cohere with the fundamental values of our society. See, e.g., id. at 20 (describing the
ethical modality as expressing the American ethos of limited government); DWORKIN, supra note 133, at
285 (describing the courts' obligation to "try to discover principles justifying not only the text of the
Constitution but the traditions and practices ... that are also part of our constitutional record" as the
central idea of "a jurisprudence of principle"). To the extent that such values evolve, they depart from
the original understanding and to the extent that normative argument is indeterminate, it sacrifices
textualism's commitment to clarity.
I recognize that a complete account of constitutional interpretation would have to harmonize the
justifications for the nonoriginalist modalities with one another in the same way that Parts IV and V
attempt to harmonize originalist and nonoriginalist modalities. The broader project is beyond the scope
of this article; I believe that such a harmonization is possible, although I do not defend that belief here.
157. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
158. See Thomas W. Merrill, Bork v. Burke, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 509, 509-10, 523 (1996)
(arguing that judicial "conventionalism" serves conservative values better than originalism). But see
ACKERMAN, supra note 13, at 17-24 (arguing that Burkeanism undervalues the role of higher lawmaking in dualist democracy).
159. See, e.g., Christopher L. Eisgruber, Justice and the Text: Rethinking the ConstitutionalRelation
Between Principle and Prudence, 43 DUKE L.J. 1, 2 (1993) (tracing "constitutional authority to the
substantive goodness of constitutional norms, rather than to the process that created them").
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ment exists with
the proposition that the answer includes the text of the
60
Constitution. 1
To accept the binding authority of the constitutional text does not, as a matter
of pure logic, entail any degree of deference to original meaning. One could, in
principle, treat all of the text as if it were written and adopted (or even handed
down by God) yesterday. The question then would be, "what do these words
mean to us now?" Although such an approach is possible, it is oddly ahistorical.
We know that the Constitution was not adopted yesterday. We also know that
text alone has no meaning-meaning also requires context. 161 If we are to avoid
ahistoricism, we will wish to pay attention not only to the current context, but
also to the context in which the constitutional text was adopted.
To illustrate the point, suppose that the Constitution were written in Middle
English. Before attempting to apply its text to present-day cases, even a
nonoriginalist judge would probably want to understand what the text meant at
the time of its adoption. The judge does not need to understand the original text
because she believes that the original understanding binds later interpreters.
Rather, the modem judge would need to resort to history simply to unearth a
comprehensible textual starting point.
In some cases, constitutional interpretation appears to proceed along similar
lines. Consider the question of whether the Second Amendment protects a
private right of armed self-defense. The relevant text states: "A well regulated
Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to
keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." 1 62 The concept of a "well
regulated Militia" is a cypher to most late-twentieth-century readers. In some
quarters, it signifies private groups of self-styled patriots ready to defend the
people against perceived excesses of government, while to others the term may
conjure the image
of the national armed forces or of the state units of the
63
national guard. 1
Assuming that the phrase "well regulated Militia" has no commonly accepted modem usage, a late-twentieth-century interpreter would first wish to
discern its meaning in the eighteenth century and then to translate that meaning
into modern English. Nothing in this enterprise commits the modern reader to
seeking or to following the intentions of the eighteenth-century adopters of the
160. See DWORKIN, supra note 28, at 358 (treating the constitutional text as a starting point for
interpretation); TRIBE, supra note 120, at 14 (same).
161. To give a very simple example, to one who does not know how to read English, the marks on
this page mean nothing, or perhaps mean something very different from what they mean to readers of
English. See Laurence H. Tribe, Comment in SCALIA, supra note 2, at 77.
162. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
163. Compare Sanford Levinson, The EmbarrassingSecond Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637 (1989)
(interpreting the Second Amendment to protect an individual right of armed self-defense) with Gary
Wills, To Keep and Bear Arms, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, September 21, 1995, at 62 (arguing that the
individual right interpretation contradicts the original understanding). See also Robert J. Cottrol &
Raymond T. Diamond, The Second Amendment: Toward an Afro-Americanist Reconsideration, 80 GEO.
L.J. 309, 311 n.6 (1991) (collecting sources). Notably, even the individual right interpretation offers
little support for the recent rise of the militia movement.
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language. But to the extent that text matters to the modem interpreter, it
sometimes will be nearly impossible to make
any sense out of the text without
64
understanding an earlier historical context.'
The point is not that English usage has changed dramatically since the
late-eighteenth century. Plainly it has not. For the most part, the Constitution
does not use archaic language. However, given changed social circumstances,
some provisions of the Constitution may appear as if they were written in
archaic language. Understanding the original context will
typically help us to
65
1
world.
modem
the
in
texts
such
apply
to
how
understand
We already have encountered one arguable example of a text whose meaning
66
has been obscured by developments since its enactment-the Takings Clause. 1
Given various late-eighteenth-century assumptions about the nature of property
rights, early interpreters of the Clause would have understood it to apply only to
appropriations, and not to regulations. 167 To the modem legal mind, however,
"property" denotes a complex set of relationships, with an emphasis on economic value rather than on older notions of the right to exclude.
Plainly,
68
regulation may diminish economic value as much as confiscation. 1
How does the shift in context bear on the interpretive exercise? To the
originalist, the question answers itself. She will prefer the meaning generated by
the historical context during the period of adoption over the meaning that the
Clause might bear today.
At first, it might appear that, conversely, a nonoriginalist would deem the
older meaning irrelevant. 169 The modem context, by assumption, provides a
relatively clear meaning which the nonoriginalist should implement. Yet even a
nonoriginalist may deem the older meaning relevant, albeit for a different
reason from the one upon which the originalist relies.
Most nonoriginalists will consider value arguments relevant. In applying a
constitutional provision, the nonoriginalist will ask, among other things, how
best to implement the values at the provision's core. Blinding oneself to the
provision's original context may impoverish the modem interpreter's understanding of the values that it protects. Putting the matter in the affirmative, knowledge of the original meaning of a constitutional provision will enable the
nonoriginalist interpreter to construct the best, most coherent account of the

164. See Brest, supra note 1, at 208-09 (arguing that textualist and intentionalist arguments converge).
165. See Lessig, supra note 96, at 410-14 (discussing translation).
166. See supra notes 111-112 and accompanying text.
167. See Treanor, supra note 112, at 782. The contrarian reader who contests this historical account
should substitute her own favorite example, as the argument does not rest on the historical accuracy of
the particular illustration.
168. For an interesting attempt to grapple with the effects of changes in the conception of property,
see Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Comm'n, 505 U.S. 1003, 1034-36 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
169. See supra notes 111-112 and accompanying text (arguing that Lessig's view entails this
approach).
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provision. 170
Returning to the Takings Clause example, the modem reading seems to
provide protection for a wide assortment of economic interests. Yet in the
post-New Deal era, courts have been reluctant to subject economic regulation
to anything but the most minimal scrutiny. Robust enforcement of the modem
meaning of the Takings Clause fits uncomfortably with the remainder of modem
constitutional law.
By attempting to recapture the earlier meaning of the Clause, a modern court
searches for an understanding of the values that the Clause serves that coheres
with, rather than contradicts, other tenets of modem constitutional law. Thus, a
nonoriginalist would not try to implement the original understanding of the
Takings Clause simply because it is the original understanding. Instead, she
would ask what values would be protected by a Takings Clause that primarily
protects against confiscation. She might account for such a vision by emphasizing the "private" in "private property"--connecting the ability to exclude
others from one's real and tangible personal property to a conception of the

person. 171
Having located in the relevant provision a core value that coheres with the
rest of constitutional law, the modem reader need not, of course, consider
herself bound by all features of the original understanding. Applying the core
value that protected only against confiscations in the eighteenth century may
lead to broader (or narrower) protection in the modem era. The original context
provides the modem reader with "paradigm cases,"172 which can be used to
locate in the text a suitable value to enforce. 173 However, the paradigm cases do
174
not themselves supplant the text or even the core value.
Resort to historical context enables the nonoriginalist judge to root normative
170. I emphasize fit here in much the same way that Ronald Dworkin does-although note that
Dworkin's conception of the relevance of context appears to be more intentionalist than necessary. In
distinguishing his views from those of strict originalists, Dworkin nonetheless deems intentions
relevant as such, stating that "[w]e turn to history to answer the question of what they intended to say,
not the different question of what other intentions they had." Dworkin, supra note 133, at 48.
171. See generally C. Edwin Baker, Property and its Relation to ConstitutionallyProtectedLiberty,
134 U. PA. L. REv. 741 (1986) (analyzing the values that underlie conceptions of property and property
rules).
172. Rubenfeld, supra note 117, at 1169-71.
173. See id. at 1170 ("Courts should consult this history not to discern what some set of authoritative speakers would have said about the interpretive questions that judges alone must answer, but to
illuminate the core ideas that underlie the constitutional language.").
174. Of course, the question of how to describe the paradigm case can be quite tricky. For example,
there would be no dispute that Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793), was the paradigm case to which
the Eleventh Amendment responded. Yet one could describe the paradigmatic problem alternatively as a
problem with diversity jurisdiction, or more generally, as a problem with private suits against states. See
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). In the Supreme Court's recent decision in Seminole Tribe v.
Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996), the Court takes a relatively broad view. In responding to the argument
that state sovereign immunity applies to diversity cases but not to federal question cases, the Court
states that in amending Article III, the drafters of the Eleventh Amendment did not specify that
sovereign immunity applies in federal question cases because at the time, federal district courts did not
have federal question jurisdiction. See id. at 1130.
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arguments in values that derive from the Constitution's text. This kind of
invocation of original meaning does not rely on the conventional socialcontractarian account of originalism. Instead, resort to historical context can be
seen as a species of textual or of normative argument, or of both.
VI.

ANCESTRAL AND HEROIC ORIGINALISM

In Part V, I argued that the need to look to historical context in order to
generate meaning justifies a limited role for original understanding in constitutional interpretation. In its actual practice, however, constitutional law accords
greater scope to originalist arguments than contextualism appears to require. If
one rejects social-contractarianism but maintains a commitment to providing a
descriptively accurate account of constitutional law, then one must provide an
alternative justification for the more than minimal role that originalist arguments play in interpreting the Constitution.
Let us begin with a puzzle. Supreme Court Justices and lower court judges
routinely cite James Madison's notes and other records of the 1787 Constitutional Convention as if these sources were in some way authoritative. Employing conventional originalist theory, this reliance is problematic. Such theory
holds that modem readers should follow the interpretation given the Constitution when it was adopted because the act of ratification gave the Constitution
the legitimate force of law. 175 Yet the records of the Convention are a poor tool
for discerning the Ratifiers' original understanding because the Convention
deliberated in secret. The most comprehensive account of the Convention is
first published more than fifty years after the
contained in Madison's notes,
176
Convention's conclusion.
Recognizing that the Convention records are a poor tool for discerning the
views of the Ratifiers, some originalists argue that these records provide a rough
sense of the informed opinion of the day. 177 Similarly, according to the conventional originalist view, the Federalist Papers-which were written for the purpose of persuading
New Yorkers to ratify the Constitution-merely illustrate
1 78
public sentiment.
Granting that Madison's notes and the Federalist Papers have some relevance
to the social-contractarian originalist enterprise, I would argue that this should
not be their principal relevance in constitutional interpretation. If we dispense
with social-contractarian premises, the views of the Framers-as opposed to the
175. See BORK, supra note 2, at 144 (1990) (discussing views of the Ratifiers); Scalia, supra note
144, at 856 (describing records of the ratifying conventions' debates as an essential element for
originalist jurisprudence).
176. See Baade, supra note 62, at 1048.
177. See Monaghan, supra note 10, at 725-26 (noting that "while the term original intent is
commonly used, original understanding better conveys the public dimensions of originalism").
178. See, e.g., Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 723 (1988) (explaining that debates at the
Constitutional Convention provide evidence of the background expectations about the way that the Full
Faith and Credit Clause would operate).
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Ratifiers-are relevant to constitutional interpretation for two primary reasons.
First, we care about what the Framers thought because, whether we like it or
not, our own understanding has been shaped against the backdrop of theirs.
Second, we believe that the Founders of the Republic had insight into the
problems of government which their handiwork addressed. I refer to the interpretive techniques that correspond to these reasons as ancestral and heroic originalism respectively.
A. ANCESTRAL ORIGINALISM

To see how ancestral originalism operates, suppose that a judge generally
rejects social-contractarianism, believing that she should interpret the Constitution to give effect to the core values of contemporary society. Nevertheless,
discerning those values may require engaging originalist sources. As an initial
matter, the thought patterns of a judge educated in the American constitutional
tradition inevitably will be influenced by the Framers' views, whether or not she
takes explicit account of those views. On many important constitutional issues,
the various positions in the contemporary debate will have developed in response to arguments first set forth by the Framers. Thus, we may think of
Madison et al. as framers of the debate about the Constitution as well as
Framers of the Constitution itself.
Of course, it is one thing to say that a judge's thought patterns will be
indirectly influenced by the Framers' thoughts. It is quite another to say that a
judge consciously ought to give weight to the Framers' views. The case for
ancestral originalism relies upon the claim that tracing the historical origins of
an idea elucidates the meaning of the idea and opens one up to possible
meanings that may not be immediately apparent from an ahistorical perspective.
Consider a concrete example-the question of whether an Act of Congress
directing a state legislature to pass a law violates the Constitution's protections
for state sovereignty. In New York v. United States, 17 9 the Court invalidated such
federal "commandeering." Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court noted that
at the 1787 Constitutional Convention, the Framers chose a system of dual
sovereignty in which the federal government could regulate the People directly,
without relying on state intermediaries as it had to under the Articles of
Confederation. 1 80 In dissent, Justice Stevens protested that the point of the
Constitution was to increase federal power over the States, and therefore, absent
express prohibitory language, the Constitution should not be construed as
removing regulation through state intermediaries as an option. 181 Importantly,
neither the majority nor dissenting opinion professed that its reading should be
preferred because of the 1787 understanding of the words in question; rather,
each sought to ground its purposive interpretation in a conception of the
179. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
180. See id. at 163-66.
181. Id. at 210.
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Framers' design. As a more general matter, because we live in a political world
shaped in significant measure by the Framers' vision,1 1 2 we would do well to
consult that vision as a presumptive starting point for contemporary analysis.
The contemporary debate about the role of the "canon" of Western literature,
philosophy, art, and history in American education casts light on the idea and
the scope of ancestral originalism. 83 The best arguments for retaining a core
Western canon do not assume that Western culture is superior to other cultures.
Rather, persuasive traditionalist arguments emphasize the degree to which
contemporary American civilization is part of a Western culture with deep
historical roots. Thoughtful traditionalists thus emphasize that understanding
contemporary American civilization requires a thorough grounding in Western
Civilization. 184 Conversely, critics of a narrowly defined canon do well to
emphasize the pluralist character of contemporary American civilization185
especially given the non-Western origins of large proportions of the population.
The debate over the canon contains both a descriptive and a normative
component. As a descriptive matter, the disputants disagree over the extent to
which contemporary American civilization is rooted in Western culture. 186 As a
normative matter, the disputants recognize that the canon will play some role in
shaping the future evolution of American civilization. 18 7 Along this front,
traditionalists sometimes claim superiority for Western culture, 188 but more

182. To be sure, the size and scope of the federal government greatly exceed what the Framers
originally contemplated. But the particular shape of the national administrative government continues
to reflect original design. See ACKERMAN, supra note 13, at 19-20, 34-57, 165-67.
183. See generally N.Y. STATE SOC. STUDIEs REv. AND DEV. COMM., ONE NATION, MANY PEOPLES: A
DECLARATION OF CULTURAL INDEPENDENCE (June 1991) [hereinafter ONE NATION].
184. See Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Dissenting Opinion, in id. at 45, 46 (asking whether, instead of
"cultivating and reinforcing ethnic differences," it would "not be more appropriate for students to be
'continually' encouraged to understand the American culture in which they are growing up and to
prepare for an active role in shaping that culture").
185. See id. at 1 (majority report) (citing demography as a basis for multiculturalism).
186. Compare RICHARD BROOKHISER, THE WAY OF THE WASP 22 (1991) (characterizing American
Indian culture as a "sideshow of American history" and stating that "black slaves were in no position
to shape the institutions of WASP society directly") andArthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., History as Therapy:
A DangerousIdea, N.Y. TIvEs, May 3, 1996, at A31 (disagreeing with the claim that European, African,
and Amerindian culture contributed to American history in equal measure, and claiming that "the
formative American political ideas . .. are peculiarly European in origin") with MOLEFI KETE AsAN'E,
KEMET, AFROCENTRICITY AND KNOWLEDGE 161-93 (1990) (arguing that traditional American institutions
ignore the African influences on African-American culture and American culture in general) and Hans
Bak, Introduction to MULTICULTURALISM AND THE CANON OF AMERICAN CULTURE xi (Hans Bak ed.,
1993) (noting how some multiculturalists argue that "it may be time to acknowledge multiculturalism
as a 'fact' of America").
187. Compare ONE NATION, supra note 183, at 1 (majority report) ("If the United States is to
continue to prosper in the 21st century, then all of its citizens, whatever their race or ethnicity, must
believe that they and their ancestors have shared in the building of the country and have a stake in its
success.") with id. at 45 (dissenting opinion) (warning of "the danger of a society divided into distinct
and immutable ethnic and racial groups, each taught to cherish its own apartness from the rest").
188. See BROOKIUSER, supra note 186, at 29-39 (listing six characteristics which, in the author's
view, are uniquely combined in white Anglo-Saxon Protestants and account for American peace and
prosperity).
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commonly invoke the supposed benefits that come from sharing a single,
national, linguistic, and cultural identity. 189 Conversely, some critics claim
primacy for non-Western cultures,' 90 but more typically invoke the supposed
benefits that come from a multicultural, pluralist society.1 9 '
Returning to constitutional interpretation, it appears that ancestral originalism
roughly corresponds to the traditionalist position in the descriptive debate over
the canon. To the extent that we believe that the Framers' vision continues
to
92
shape our existing political institutions, we do well to study their vision.'
B. HEROIC ORIGINALISM

Like the debate about the canon, the debate about the proper role of originalist argument in constitutional interpretation is a debate about what we want our
institutions to become. If we regarded the role that the Framers' vision has
played in shaping us with indifference, we would stop at ancestral originalism.
However, we also value the views of the Framers because we believe that in
many respects they were wise and farsighted. To a significant degree, they are
our heroes. Thus, heroic originalism supplements ancestral originalism.
Together, the ancestral and heroic originalism models provide a useful basis
for understanding how arguments that invoke the original meaning fit within an
otherwise nonoriginalist context. First, both conceptions explain why we care at
least as much about the views of the Framers as we care about the views of the
Ratifiers. The act of ratification-so critical to legitimacy on a socialcontractarian account-tells us relatively little about the design of the Constitution. Instead, if we seek legitimacy in other sources, the ancestral model looks
to the Founding for the genesis of a political philosophy that continues to
influence us. The Constitutional Convention of 1787 was critical in this regard.
Similarly, we accord heroic status to those who participated in the "Miracle in
Philadelphia," rather than those who attended the ratifying conventions.
189. See, e.g., ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE DIsuNrrITNG OF AMERICA 80 (1991) (stating that
"[tihe genius of America lies in its capacity to forge a single nation from peoples of remarkably diverse
racial, religious, and ethnic origins"); Multiculturalism: Sounds Nice but It Has Dangers, USA TODAY,
Dec. 7, 1995, at All (reporting speech by former Vice-President Quayle urging that "we should always
focus on what unites us-namely, the ideals, the goals, and the culture of our country").
190. See, e.g., ASANTE, supra note 186, passim (arguing that the Greek foundation of European
culture derives from Egyptian culture); GEORGE G. M. JAMES, STOLEN LEGACY, passim (reprint 1988)
(same).
191. See, e.g., HENRY Louis GATES, JR., LOOSE CANONS: NOTES ON THE CULTURE WARS xiv-xvii
(1992) (arguing that given the fact of heterogeneity, multiculturalism offers the best hope for transcending differences to forge a civic culture open to all); Michael Walzer, Pluralism:A PoliticalPerspective,
in HARVARD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN ETHNIC GROUPS 781, 784-85 (Stephan Themstrom ed., 1980)
(arguing that pluralism sustains the culture of minority groups against assimilation, celebrates cultural
identity, and builds the community).
192. Note, however, that the ancestral model need not be static. The ancestral model views the
relation of the present to the past as one of organic preservation; the present need not treat the
Constitution as an artifact. See generally PAUL W. KAHN, LEGITIMACY AND HISTORY (1992) (associating
artifacts with the model of "making" and organisms with the model of "maintenance," but concluding
that ultimately neither model solves the problem that time poses for popular sovereignty).
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Of course, many of the representatives to the Constitutional Convention were
also vocal participants in the ratification debates. But it is the former capacity
that often gives them their current authority. Thus, although Madison, Hamilton,
and Jay authored the Federalist Papers as ratification proponents, one often
encounters citations of the Federalist Papers as support for the views of "the
Framers." This does not reflect sloppy history,
but instead an implicit accep19 3
tance of the ancestral and heroic models.
Furthermore, ancestral and heroic originalism explain how post-enactment
events or normative arguments can outweigh evidence of original intent. Under
the ancestral model, unearthing the root of modem political institutions or
arguments sometimes will reveal that they rest on factually or morally outdated
premises. In terms of heroic originalism, we might say that we do not engage in
unqualified hero worship. When the Framers' values present a profound conflict
with the values of contemporary society-for example, in their acceptance of
certain racial or sexual prejudices-we will not deem the Framers heroes.
The Supreme Court's reasoning in Brown v. Board of Education'94 rests on
just this sort of discounting of the Framers" 9 5 authority. The Court stated:
In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the
[Fourteenth] Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v.
Ferguson was written. We must consider public education in the light of its
full development and its present place in American life throughout the Nation.
Only in this way can it be determined if segregation in
96 public schools
deprives these plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws.'
Whether changes in the institution of public education-or, as the Brown Court
also suggests, advances in psychological knowledge 9 7-were so profound as to
warrant entirely discounting the views of the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment constitutes a contestable (and contested) 1 9 8 proposition. But the Court's
more basic point is surely sound. A Congress that had only seen the abolition of
slavery within the preceding few years was not fully qualified to judge whether

193. Note that Jay was not only a representative to the Convention, but he also played the smallest
role in authoring the Federalist Papers. See Randy E. Barnett, The Relevance of the Framers'Intent, 19
HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 403, 408-09 (1996).

194. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
195. As is customary, I refer to the "Framers" of the Fourteenth Amendment in the same way that
one refers to the Framers of the original Constitution. In a technical sense, every amendment will have
its Framers. Under the ancestral and heroic models, a judge rightly gives greater deference to the views
of the Framers of the original Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and transformative amendments than to
the Framers of a more technical amendment. There is, however, no need to distinguish sharply between
transformative and technical amendments, as the ancestral and heroic models are a matter of degree.
196. Brown, 347 U.S. at 492-93.
197. See id. at494 & n.1.
198. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038, 2064 & n.2 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(questioning the validity of psychological studies cited in Brown purporting to show that de jure
segregation harmed black students by generating "a feeling of inferiority").
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segregation could be consistent with equality. No doubt many in Congress had
views on the question, but those views were at best projections and at worst
expressions of prejudices. As such, they did not constitute the kind of wisdom to
which the Court nearly a century later would reasonably defer.
By 1954, the lawfulness of segregation posed a question as to which the
history of segregation provided considerably more information than did the
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment's Framers. To anyone who did not
willfully blind herself to reality, the experience of living under Jim Crow taught
beyond any reasonable doubt that, at least as practiced in the United States,
separate was not equal. 199
Of course, changed circumstances do not inevitably render the Framers'
understanding irrelevant. For example, consider the question of whether the
Tenth Amendment imposes any judicially enforceable limits on federal legislation, beyond the requirement that some power delegated by Article I must
authorize the legislation. In Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan TransitAuthority, 200 the Supreme Court essentially held that it does not. Relying on Madison's
view that the Constitution protects state sovereignty and individual liberty
through structural mechanisms, the Garcia Court stated that "the principal
means chosen by the Framers to ensure the role of the States in the federal
system lies in the structure of the Federal Government itself.", 20 1 The Court
explained that, among other things, the states "were given ... direct influence

in the Senate, where each State received equal representation and each Senator
20 2
was to be selected by the legislature of his State.",
This argument is anachronistic. Since the adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913, the people of each state directly elect their Senators. Thus, one of
the original assumptions underlying the view that structural provisions adequately
protect state sovereignty no longer holds. Accordingly, under ancestral or heroic
originalism, a modem interpreter might conclude that judicially enforceable norms of
state sovereignty are now necessary, even if they were not in Madison's time.
Before entirely discounting the Framers' perspective, however, it pays to ask
if we can learn from it. In this context, consider the possibility that the political
safeguards for state sovereignty include a structural mechanism that the Framers
did not anticipate: the existence of national political parties that coordinate the
work of state and federal office holders. 20 3 If political parties do an adequate job
of protecting state sovereignty, then the Garcia Court may well have been
correct in relying on structural mechanisms alone to protect state interests.
199. See Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421
(1960) (arguing that segregation was a legal mechanism intended to disadvantage blacks).
200. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
201. Id. at 550 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison)).
202. Id. at 551.
203. See Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV.- 1485, 1522-42 (1994)
(arguing that throughout American history, political parties have been the principal institutions responsible for brokering state/federal relations because members of a political party at the state level
coordinate their activities with party members at the federal level).
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C. ANCESTRAL AND HEROIC ORIGINALISM IN PRACTICE

The Supreme Court already utilizes ancestral and heroic originalism, even if
it does not always recognize that it does so. Consider, for example, Justice
2 °4
Brandeis' famous concurrence in Whitney v. California.
I quote it at length
here to illustrate precisely how Brandeis deems the Framers' views relevant to
constitutional interpretation. Brandeis wrote:
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the State
was to make men free to develop their faculties; and that in its government the
deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary. They valued liberty both
as an end and as a means. They believed liberty to be the secret of happiness
and courage to be the secret of liberty. They believed that freedom to think as
you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery
and spread of political truth; that without free speech and assembly discussion
would be futile; that with them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine .... They recognized the
risks to which all human institutions are subject. But they knew ... that it is
hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination; that fear breeds
repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government;
that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed
grievances and proposed
remedies; and that the fitting remedy for evil coun20 5
sels is good ones.
These words sound in heroic originalism. 20 6 Note first that Justice Brandeis
does not trace the First Amendment to its ratification or to its proposal by the
First Congress or even to the ratification of the original Constitution, which was
accomplished in part because the Federalists promised to introduce a Bill of
Rights.2 °7 Instead, Brandeis traces the philosophy underlying the First Amendment to "[t]hose who won our independence," that is, to the heroes of the
Revolutionary War. Brandeis glowingly describes their valour and quite consciously links their admirable personal traits with their philosophy of freedom.
Although less obvious, the Whitney concurrence also sounds in ancestral
originalism. The cadence of Brandeis's prose dares the reader to disagree.20 8
"Here is how your ancestors lived," Brandeis asserts. "Will you dare to commit
intellectual parricide?"
204. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
205. Id. at 375.
206. See Vincent Blasi, The FirstAmendment and the Ideal of Civic Courage: The Brandeis Opinion
in Whitney v. California, 29 WM. & MARY L. REv. 653, 671-81 (1988) (arguing that Brandeis invokes a
heroic notion of the Framers as founders of democracy in the spirit of Athens).
207. See Michael C. Doff, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 HARV. L. REv. 1175,
1187-88 (1996).
208. Cf Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principlesand Some FirstAmendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 24
(1971) (describing Brandeis and Holmes as "rhetoricians of extraordinary potency [whose] rhetoric
retains the power ... to swamp analysis, to persuade, almost to command assent," but nonetheless
disagreeing with Brandeis's claims).
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I do not contend that all, or even most, judicial invocations of the Framers
self-consciously sound in ancestral or heroic originalism. It may well be that
courts typically invoke the Framers for the purported purpose of demonstrating
the Framers' views pursuant to social contract theory. I do contend, however,
that numerous invocations of the Framers sound in ancestral or heroic originalism and that whatever subjective reasons judges may have had for invoking the
Framers, often ancestral and heroic originalism better capture the sense of the
argument than social contract theory. Consider an opinion authored by Justice
20 9
Scalia, who generally accepts some form of social-contractarian originalism.
Dissenting in Lee v. Weisman,21 ° Justice Scalia asserted that the "Founders of
our Republic ... knew that nothing, absolutely nothing, is so inclined to foster
among religious believers of various faiths a toleration-no, an affection-for
one another than voluntarily joining in prayer together, to the God whom they
all worship and seek.", 2 11 It is possible that Justice Scalia meant that the
Founders' knowledge must be read as a limitation on the text of the Establishment Clause. More likely, however, Justice Scalia invoked the Framers because
he believed that the Court was ignoring a lesson that they had learned. He
invoked their status and their example.2 12

209. See Scalia, supra note 144, passim.
210. 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (invalidating an official prayer at a public high school graduation
ceremony).
211. Id. at 646 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
212. The Court's recent decision in Seminole, holding that the Indian Commerce Clause does not
authorize Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity, illustrates how an opinion that appears to
invoke social-contractarian originalism may be understood better as an instance of ancestral and heroic
originalism. In dissent, Justice Souter argued that "[tihe imperative of legislative control [over
sovereign immunity] grew directly out of the Framers' revolutionary idea of popular sovereignty." Id. at
1173 (Souter, J., dissenting). Under the social contract view of original meaning, the point of this
argument would be to show that the Framers expected Congress to have the power to abrogate state
sovereign immunity-and therefore the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with this
expectation. But notice that Justice Souter suggests more. Popular sovereignty is not merely a concept
with which the Framers saddled us. It continues to be a core ideal of American democracy, cf supra
Part liA (discussing Ackerman's notion of popular sovereignty); infra Part V (discussing the relation
between popular sovereignty and original meaning), and that is how Justice Souter's opinion treats it.
Thus, Justice Souter invokes ancestral originalism. Moreover, by referring to popular sovereignty as a
"revolutionary idea," Justice Souter invokes the heroic status of the Framers in much the same way as
Justice Brandeis did in Whitney.
Similarly, consider Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982), holding that the President enjoys
absolute immunity against civil suits for damages based on official acts. In an important footnote,
Justice Powell's opinion for the Court discusses the "historical evidence from which it may be inferred
that the Framers assumed the President's immunity from damages liability." Id. at 750 n.31. The
opinion's discussion of the course of the debates at the Constitutional Convention and the views held by
the delegates to the Convention might appear to rest on the familiar social-contractarian view of
original meaning. Yet Justice Powell's discussion of the views of the Framers is of a piece with his
discussion of the views expressed by Thomas Jefferson during his Presidency and by Justice Story,
writing nearly half a century after the Constitutional Convention. See id. Justice Powell connects the
original understanding to the entire tide of American history, stating that in addition to its roots in the
original understanding, "powerful support" for his argument "derives from the actual history of private
lawsuits against the President." Id. As Justice Powell notes in the main text of the opinion, the view he
espouses is "rooted in the constitutional tradition of the separation of powers and supported by our
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Although ancestral and heroic originalism often work in tandem, in some
respects they proceed from different premises. When they do, it may be
important not to conflate the two kinds of arguments. For example, in Brandeis's
Whitney concurrence, it is not entirely clear whether we should honor the
Founders' views about freedom and courage simply because the Founders
expressed these ideas and because they shaped the world we inhabit, or whether
we should honor the Founders' views because those views deserve our respect,
regardless of who held them. The conflation can lead to overvaluing original
meaning, because the conditions necessary to accord the Framers special deference as our ancestors sometimes differ from those necessary to accord them
special deference as our heroes.
Indeed, properly understood, ancestral and heroic originalism recognize that
in some instances the fact that the Framers held some view about a constitutional provision should count as affirmative evidence against that view. I shall
illustrate this claim with an example involving the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 1 3
Imagine that in 1997 a state prohibited the practice of law by women. Under
the modem view of the Equal Protection Clause, such a prohibition must satisfy
(at least) intermediate scrutiny,214 which it undoubtedly would fail. How would
the law fare under the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment? In
Bradwell v. Illinois, 2 15 decided a mere four years after the Fourteenth Amendment's adoption, the Supreme Court upheld such a law. Assuming that the
Bradwell Court's view broadly reflected the contemporary views of the almost
exclusively male legal community about gender equality, one could fairly
attribute the Court's view to the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment. 16 How
can we reconcile modem doctrine with the original meaning?
Bobbitt might say that the conscience of the judge must mediate the conflict
between doctrine and history. In other words, the considerations favoring the
modem view outweigh the original understanding. The result is surely desirable,
but the process appears ad hoc.
A more committed originalist like Ackerman would probably resort to synthehistory." Id. at 749. The opinion sounds in ancestral originalism by connecting the original understanding to a continuous and ongoing tradition; it sounds in heroic originalism by noting the special place
accorded to the wisdom of the Framers. See id. at 750 n.31 ("[H]istorical evidence must be weighed as
well as cited. When the weight of evidence is considered, we think we must place our reliance on the
contemporary understanding of John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, and Oliver Ellsworth.").
213. I have used this example in two essays. See Michael C. Dorf, A NonoriginalistPerspective on
the Lessons of History, 19 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 351, 356-58 (1996) [hereinafter A Nonoriginalist
Perspective]; Michael C. Doff, A Comment on Text, Time, and Audience Understanding in Constitutional Law, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 983, 986-88 (1995).
214. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 152 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting
that "[in over 20 cases beginning in 1971 ...we have subjected government classifications based on
sex to heightened scrutiny").
215. 83 U.S. 130 (1872).
216. The fact that the text of the Fourteenth Amendment endorses a gender line for voting, see U.S.
CONST. amend. X1V, § 2 (referring to "male inhabitants"), tends to confirm this inference.
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sis-contending perhaps that the Nineteenth Amendment's expression of gender
equality "relates back" to the Fourteenth's requirement of equal protection. But
recall from our earlier discussion that one might alternatively read the Nineteenth Amendment's reference to voting as implying that the Constitution does
not contain a general requirement of gender equality. A determined Ackermanian then might claim that the women's rights movement of the 1970s (or
1940s? or 1850s?) constituted an informal amendment which the judge must
construe along with the text of the Fourteenth Amendment. We have already
explored the shortcomings of such devices, however.2 17
Now consider the approach of ancestral and heroic originalism. When intervening developments reveal that the Framers lacked expertise, we may discount
their views. In the present case, the Framers' views have not merely become
outdated. If we ask, "why did the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
believe most forms of gender discrimination to be permissible?" we will find an
answer that bears directly on our modem problem.
In 1868 the Equal Protection Clause was widely understood to permit many
governmental gender-based classifications, because the legal and social culture of the time was the product and producer of gender-stereotyped thinking.
Yet our (nonoriginalist) sources of constitutional meaning tell us that the
Equal Protection Clause treats as invidious those classifications that disadvantage groups that have traditionally been subject to discrimination in this
way.

2 18

Like a witness whose testimony is so incredible as to persuade the jury that
the facts are contrary to what the witness asserts, on some occasions the
reasoning of the Framers-viewed in modem perspective-will be so flawed or
distasteful as to suggest that the Constitution means the opposite of what they
assumed. Neither contractarian originalism nor an eclecticism that encompasses
contractarian originalism can explain this phenomenon. Ancestral and heroic
originalism can. 2 19 During the century and a quarter since Bradwell, our factual
assumptions about the differences between men and women have changed so

217. See infra Part IA.
218. Dorf, A NonoriginalistPerspective, supra note 213, at 358.
219. In some respects, ancestral and heroic originalism treat original meaning in much the way that
Ronald Dworkin argues that a judge ought to treat legislative history. As Dworkin explains, the judge
"treats the various statements that make up the legislative history as political acts that his interpretation
of the statute must fit and explain, just as it must fit and explain the text of the statute itself." DwoRKiN,
supra note 28, at 314. Ancestral originalism especially is sensitive to fit in this way. In addition, original
meaning may sometimes be exploited in different, indeed contrary, ways. In the gender-discrimination
example, the very poor fit between the Framers' concrete expectations and the ideal we believe the
Equal Protection Clause embodies leads us to count the Framers' concrete expectations as evidence
against themselves. This goes well beyond Dworkin's view that a judge may discount concrete
expectations that are inconsistent with the broader purposes of the text. See id. at 363 (justifying Brown
on the ground that the conflict between the "framers' concrete opinion about segregation" and "their
more abstract convictions about equality" required the Court to ignore the former).
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much as to break the ancestral chain. Similarly, modem views about the
immorality of gender discrimination place the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment in a particularly unheroic light.
The question remains, however, whether ancestral and heroic originalism
reconcile contemporary value arguments and historical practice at too high a
price. What empowers a court to say that the Framers' values are simply too
distasteful to count as support for a given proposition? Does my proposed use of
ancestral and heroic originalism contain the same flaw as Bobbitt's? In other
words, is the account's apparently selective use of history unprincipled?
Questions such as these assume that originalism is the presumptively correct
starting point for constitutional interpretation so that departures from original
understanding require a special justification. Yet that assumption is not shared
by nonoriginalists, nor is it self-justifying. The privileging of original understanding rests on a controversial view of legitimacy. As I explain below, ancestral and
heroic originalism rest on a different understanding of legitimacy.
D. LEGITIMACY

I have claimed in this Part that reconceptualizing some significant portion of
originalist argumentation as heroic or ancestral originalism can narrow the gap
between a normatively attractive nonsocial-contractarian account of constitutional law and a descriptively accurate account that recognizes a role for
original meaning. What does the shift from social-contractarian to noncontractarian originalism imply for legitimacy?
The traditional view of originalism perceives legitimacy as deriving from the
act of lawmaking. Because ratification constitutes the last necessary step in the
process, conventional originalism emphasizes the intent of the Ratifiers.22 °
Ancestral and heroic originalism use original meaning to legitimate constitutional interpretation in a different manner. Under these models, an appeal to the
Framers constitutes an appeal to moral authority and expertise. Other things
being equal (or even somewhat less than equal), if the Framers thought a
constitutional provision should work in a particular fashion, that fact counts as
an argument in favor of it working in that manner. The Framers' unique
historical position and whatever wisdom we believe they possessed justify a
degree of deference.
Ancestral and heroic originalism are less ambitious than social-contractarian
originalism. Unlike strict originalism, ancestral and heroic originalism do not
purport to constitute the sole basis for legitimate interpretation. Indeed, ancestral and heroic originalism cannot exist on their own. They only operate within
an eclectic context that includes a significant role for normative arguments that,
among other things, test the status of the Framers' views. Within such a context,
220. Of course, a variant of traditional originalism could focus on the intent of both the Framers and
the Ratifiers, as both are necessary steps in the enactment of a constitutional provision. Cf Brest, supra
note 1, at 214-15 (describing the problem of determining who the Adopters are).
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though, ancestral and heroic originalism fit more comfortably with other forms
of argument than does conventional originalism.
Moreover, ancestral and heroic originalism invite the interpreter to expand
her search for constitutional meaning. If we appeal to the Framers because we
believe that their unusual place in history as well as their wisdom make their
views especially authoritative, should we not also consult the views of other
historically well-situated, wise actors? Although he did not attend the Constitu-

tional Convention, Thomas Jefferson holds a place in the constitutional pantheon-his ideas certainly affected the final document, especially the Bill of
Rights. 221 Abraham Lincoln was assassinated before the adoption of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, but his thoughts and his conduct
of the Civil War exerted a major influence on their eventual shape-not to
mention our more general views of the Union.22 2
In short, ancestral and heroic originalism ascribe to the Framers an extremely
important role, but others have roles to play as well. In particular, ancestral and
heroic originalism invite us to construct a nonoriginalist picture of history that
accords weight to post-enactment developments. I sketch such an account
below.
E. POST-ENACTMENT HISTORY

In the previous Sections of this Part, I provided some examples of how
post-enactment events can call into question the premises of the original
understanding of a constitutional provision. In this Section, I argue that historical events often inform constitutional interpretation more directly and in a way
that reinforces the ancestral and heroic models.
We have already seen the use of post-enactment history in Brown. Theexperience of Jim Crow did not merely undermine the case for deferring to the
views of the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment about the legality of
segregation. That experience also painted for the Court a vivid picture of
segregation as it actually existed,223so that the Court could assert with confidence
that separate could not be equal.
Other landmark twentieth-century cases use history in much the same way.
221. See TRIBE & DORF, supra note 26, at 6, 122 n.2; SCALIA, supra note 2, at 38 (stating that he too
finds Jefferson's views relevant, albeit for the rather different purpose of discerning "how the text of the
Constitution was originally understood").
222. See GARY WILLS, LINCOLN AT GETTYSBURG: THE WORDS THAT REMADE AMERICA 131-47 (1992)
(describing how the Gettysburg Address transformed Americans' understanding of the concept of
equality in the Declaration of Independence and our understanding of the Union). Charles Miller makes
a similar point in recognizing the role of "ongoing history" in constitutional interpretation. CHARLES A.
MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY

26 (1969). However, Miller distinguishes

ongoing history from conventional originalism, id. (describing "intent history"), without recognizing
the use I describe as ancestral and heroic originalism. Thus, his account does not adequately explain
how ongoing history modifies the lessons to be drawn from the Founding.
223. Of course, other events also influenced the Court's (and the Nation's) understanding. Perhaps
the most prominent of these was the experience of the Second World War. See generally DAVID
BRINKLEY, WASHINGTON GOES TO WAR (1988).
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For example, in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 4 the Supreme Court abandoned close judicial scrutiny of economic legislation, citing the Great Depression as evidence of the inadequacies
of the laissez-faire theory that had supported
22 5
scrutiny.
such
of
the use
In its partial re-affirmation of the -right to abortion, the Supreme Court in
Planned Parenthoodv. Casey,226 characterized both the Brown Court's decision
to overrule Plessy v. Ferguson and the West Coast Hotel Court's decision to
overrule Children's Hospital v. Adkins as resting on a perception of changed
facts.2 27 The immediate issue that prompted this characterization was the Casey
Court's effort to explain the circumstances justifying a departure from the stare
decisis in landmark cases. Whether the Casey Court's account of stare decisis is
convincing is beyond the scope of this article. But at a more fundamental level,
surely the Court was correct in noting that the historical events it describedJim Crow and the Great Depression-were relevant to the underlying constitutional questions addressed in Brown and West Coast Hotel respectively.
The Court does not always take post-enactment history into account, even
when it would seem quite relevant. Consider, for example, U.S. Term Limits,
Inc. v. Thornton,228 in which a five-to-four majority held that a state may not
impose term limits on members of Congress. Both the majority and the dissent
relied almost exclusively on the history surrounding the adoption of the Qualifications Clause. 229 The majority found that the Clause was meant to provide the
exclusive qualifications for members of Congress; 230 the dissent agreed that
Congress cannot impose additional qualifications, but argued that the states
may. 3
The critical factor for the dissent was that state governments do not derive
their powers from the Constitution. 3 2 The Qualifications Clause excludes
additional federally imposed qualifications because it does not authorize such
additional qualifications. As the Tenth Amendment confirms, however, states
differ from the federal government in that states possess reserved powers.
Because the Constitution does not divest the states of the power to set term
limits, their reserved powers include the power to impose term limits.
The majority denied that the states' reserved powers could include powers to
constrain the federal government. 3 3 Congress, as a national body, may not be
subject to state interference. Based on its canvassing of the Framers' views, the
224. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
225. See id. at 399-400. Of course, the opinion also sounds in legal realism and judicial restraint. See
id. at 398-99.
226. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
227. See id. at 863.
228. 115 S. Ct. 1842 (1995).
229. See id.
230. Id. at 1854.
231. Id. at 1878 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
232. Id. at 1879.
233. Id. at 1863 (opinion of the Court).
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majority concluded: "The Constitution thus creates a uniform national body
234
representing the interests of a single people."

The dissent vigorously contested this last claim. Emphasizing that the Constitution includes no mechanism for national political action independent of
officials elected in state-by-state elections, the dissent argued that the Federal

Union is a creation of the states.23 5
Thus, the case seemed to turn on questions going to the heart of constitutional
law: 236 What is the nature of the Federal Union? Who are the People? Are they
the People of the United States or the People of the united States? Each side
claimed to have the support of the Framers.
The history lessons stopped just after the adoption of the Constitution.23 7
Neither side in the debate availed itself of later developments. One can understand why the dissent chose this stance. Justice Thomas, the author of the
dissent in Term Limits, is the Court's most thoroughgoing originalist. But
Justice Stevens and the other Justices who joined his majority opinion are not
usually originalists.2 38
Moreover, in ignoring most post-enactment history, the majority squandered
an opportunity to strengthen its argument considerably. The Civil War seems to
speak directly to the question that divided the Court in Term Limits.2 39 If "We
The People ' 240 are just the Peoples of the several states, then why did the
southern states' secession effort justify President Lincoln in leading the northern
states in a war to preserve the Union? Thrice-wounded in the Civil War, Justice
Holmes understood that events on the battlefield had legal consequences. In the
course of sustaining the federal treaty power against a claim of reserved state
power, he wrote for the Court:
[W]hen we are dealing with words that also are a constituent act, like the
Constitution of the United States, we must realize that they have called into
life a being the development of which could not have been foreseen completely by the most gifted of its begetters. It was enough for them to realize or
to hope that they had created an organism; it has taken a century and has cost
their successors much sweat and blood to prove that they created a nation.

234. Id. at 1864.
235. Id. at 1876 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
236. I say "seemed," because "[b]oth the majority and the dissenting opinions embraced formal
structural axioms far broader than necessary to decide what state-passed term limits would do to the
federal/state balance of power as a functional matter." Kathleen M. Sullivan, Dueling Sovereignties:
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 109 HARv. L. REv. 78, 81 (1995).
237. Both sides relied on state practice immediately after the adoption of the Constitution.
238. Justices Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined Justice Steven's majority opinion in
Term Limits.
239. The Term Limits majority does not mention the Civil War, and in his concurrence, Justice
Kennedy emphasizes that post-Civil War cases supporting the majority's view merely re-affirmed the
pre-Civil War understanding. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc., 115 S. Ct. at 1873-74 (Kennedy, J.,
concurrence).
240. See supra note 50.
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The case before us must be considered in the light of our whole
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One might argue that Ackerman's theory of constitutional moments captures
claims such as these. But note a critical distinction between history as Holmes
uses it and as Ackerman would use it. The Civil War, in Holmes' view (and in
mine), proved that the United States had become a nation. 242 Putting to one side
the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, which changed the
Constitution's text, the War itself did not constitute an informal amendment to
the Constitution. Rather, in the aftermath of the Civil War, the argument that the
Union derives its authority from the states is significantly less tenable than it
was before the War.243 History provides judicially noticeable facts that may then
form the predicate for other kinds of constitutional arguments. In other words,
history teaches lessons.2 4
Looking to history for lessons rather than for constitutional moments dispenses with the need to distinguish between the events that qualify as constitutional moments and all other historical events that fall short of the threshold.
Under Ackerman's approach, even very significant events in the latter category
24
will not disturb an earlier understanding of the Constitution. 5 By contrast, all
historical events can teach lessons to a greater or lesser extent, depending on the
context.
In this respect, my conception of the lessons of history more closely re-

241. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416,433 (1920).
242. In one sense, of course, the Civil War only proved what war always proves-which side was
militarily superior. But such a reductionist characterization would ignore the broad principles for which
the Civil War was fought, principles which have become central to our national self-consciousness. See
DWORKIN, supra note 133, at 280 ("Constitutional lawyers say that the history and the outcome of the
Civil War showed a national commitment to some form of racial equality, and they mean this not as a
historical explanation of the causes of the war... but as a principle essential to any justification of the
slaughter."); WILLs, supra note 222, at 121-47. But see KAHN, supra note 192, at 65 (noting that the
Civil War was not immediately understood as transformative, in part because the war had been fought
to preserve the Union, rather than to transform it (citing PHILLIP PALUDAN, A COVENANT WITH DEATH 21
(1975))).
243. To be sure, the Supreme Court has not always manifested a consistent position on the effect of
the Civil War. For example, within the same opinion, the Court states in the Slaughterhouse Cases, 83
U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872), that the Emancipation Proclamation and the Thirteenth Amendment merely
formalized the War's abolition of slavery, see id. at 68, and that the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and
Fifteenth Amendments manifest no "purpose to destroy the main features of the general system" of
national-state relations. Id. at 82.
244. Of course, a sophisticated originalist will recognize this point. See BORK, supra note 2, at 352
(discussing "the lessons history provides about the [constitutional] principles meant to be enforced").
245. Ackerman's recent argument that events in the 1940s comprised a constitutional moment
recognizing the Congressional-Executive agreement as an alternative to the treaty power. see Ackerman
& Golove, supra note 48, at 861-96, appears to belie this claim. While important, such events hardly
rise to the level of the Civil War or the Great Depression in their effect on the Nation. Yet as I noted in
Part Ill, as constitutional moments proliferate, Ackerman's crucial distinction between higher lawmaking and ordinary politics becomes untenable, and his dualist theory unravels.
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sembles Jed Rubenfeld's commitmentarian view of constitutional change.24 6
Rubenfeld explains that traditional variants on originalism substitute the tacit
consent of successive generations to constitutional change for express consent
in the form of ratification. He argues that such theories fail to account for the
written nature of the Constitution. A written constitution entails more than a
one-time accession to legitimacy, even if each generation repeats the exercise.
Setting the Constitution in writing, Rubenfeld argues, implies an ongoing effort
to live in accordance with it. 247 Legitimacy, in Rubenfeld's view, derives from a
commitment that extends continuously over lifetimes rather than from discrete
acts of consent.2 48
Rubenfeld's account dispenses with the need to identify those historical
events that rise to the level of constitutional moments. In this respect, it has
greater descriptive power than Ackerman's account. Moreover, Rubenfeld's
commitmentarianism captures some of the ways in which post-enactment history shapes constitutional meaning. For example, one can characterize the
struggle for civil rights in this century as a playing out of a national commitment to racial equality-however contested the precise content of that concept
remains.
But commitmentarianism describes only a subset of the lessons of history.
History teaches lessons even when events evince no national commitments. The
lesson that the West Coast Hotel Court drew from the Great Depression
provides an example. The Great Depression did not reflect a national commitment to the inadequacy of laissez-faire economics. Indeed, the Great Depression
arguably resulted from a strong commitment to laissez-faire economic theory. If
we disregard the Ackermanian interpretation of the New Deal as reflecting
higher lawmaking and view the period as the West Coast Hotel Court did-as a
demonstration of laissez-faire's inability to revive industrial activity during a
depression-then the relevant lessons derive from largely impersonal events.
Such events comprise neither consent nor commitment. They are simply facts.
The same point applies in the Brown context. The Brown Court repudiated
the commitment to segregation of the southern states. It did so in no small part
because of what the Court (and the nation) learned about the nature of segregation during the period between Plessy and Brown. The historical development of
the institution of segregation provided information that was unavailable at the
246. See Rubenfeld, supra note 117, at 1154-63.
247. See id. Justice Story, in a variant of this argument, suggested that the written nature of the
Constitution counsels against originalism. According to Story, if the meaning of the written text must be
gathered from obscure sources, then it ceases to act as a charter for the people. See JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONsTrrUtON OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 184-85, at 137-38, § 210, at 157-58
(Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak eds., 1987) (originally published as an abridgement, 1833). Of
course, Rubenfeld does not endorse the jurisprudence of plain meaning that Story thus infers. See
Rubenfeld, supra note 117, at 1129-30. See also BOBBrrr, supra note 124, at 707-08 (describing Story's
textualist views).
248. See Rubenfeld, supra note 117, at 1155-56.
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time of the framing of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 49
Conceived broadly, post-enactment historical argument as I have described it
is a form of prudential or normative argument. In deciding how to interpret a
constitutional provision, courts routinely inquire into the costs and benefits of
various interpretations. All sorts of unspoken empirical assumptions figure into
such calculations. For example, a judge reviewing economic legislation assumes
a sufficiently well-functioning market, so that government regulations of supply
will be deemed rationally related to price. ° In allowing overbreadth challenges
to laws burdening free speech, judges assume that human beings are cautious
and self-interested, so that the chilling effect of such laws justifies relaxation of
the rules of third-party standing. 2 5
Historical argument in many cases merely constitutes an attempt to ground
the courts' empirical axioms in actual experience. In this respect, reliance on
post-enactment history represents a constraint on the otherwise relatively undisciplined fields of prudential and normative argument.
VII.

POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY AND ORIGINAL MEANING

Contextual, ancestral, and heroic originalism together provide a sound basis
for a nonsocial-contractarian understanding of the relevance of original meaning
in constitutional interpretation. Nevertheless, these models do not exhaust the
possibilities. At least in some circumstances, the social-contractarian account of
originalism may be unavoidable. In this Part, I explore the legitimate scope of
social-contractarian originalism within a generally noncontractarian framework.
Let us begin with a barely hypothetical interpretive question. The proposed
the
Twenty-Eighth Amendment2 2 provides: "The Congress and the states shall have
2 53
States.",
United
the
of
flag
the
of
desecration
physical
the
power to prohibit
Suppose the Amendment were adopted. What would it mean? For concrete-

249. See KAHN, supra note 192, at 152 (criticizing Ackerman's interpretation of the overruling of
Lochner and Plessy).
250. See Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111, 127 (1942) (stating that "[t]he maintenance by government regulation of a price for wheat undoubtedly can be accomplished as effectively by sustaining or
increasing the demand as by limiting the supply").
251. See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (stating that "[b]ecause of the
sensitive nature of constitutionally protected expression, we have not required that all of those subject
to overbroad regulations risk prosecution to test their rights").
252. I refer to the proposal as the Twenty-Eighth Amendment despite the controversy over whether
the Twenty-Seventh Amendment was properly ratified more than two centuries after it was passed by
the first Congress. Both houses of Congress have declared their view that the ratification was proper.
See 138 CONG. REc. S6948 (daily ed. May 20, 1992) (Senate vote); 138 CONG. REc. H3505 (daily ed.
May 20, 1992) (House vote). See generally Michael Stokes Paulsen, A General Theory ofArticle V: The
ConstitutionalLessons of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 677 (1993).
253. Katharine Q. Seelye, House Easily PassesAmendment to Ban Desecration of Flag,N.Y TMES,
June 29, 1995, at Al, A19. The Amendment easily passed the House in June 1995, but twice failed in
the Senate. See id. at Al; Helen Dewar, Senate Falls Short on Flag Amendment, WASH. POST, Dec. 13,
1995, at Al.
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ness, assume that immediately upon ratification, Congress enacts the Flag
Protection Act, which makes "the physical desecration of the flag of the United
States" an offense punishable by imprisonment for one year. Assume shortly
thereafter, Jane Doe bums a United States flag in front of the Jefferson Memorial to symbolize her disgust with the Twenty-Eighth Amendment and with the
Flag Protection Act. Doe moves to dismiss the ensuing indictment as a violation
of the First Amendment. She argues as follows: Congress's affirmative power to
prohibit flag desecration does not immunize its action from scrutiny under the
negative limits of the Constitution, including the First Amendment-just as the
Commerce Clause's authorization of the regulation of bumper stickers on cars
moving in interstate commerce does not mean that a federal statute prohibiting
the placement of bumper stickers criticizing the government on cars that travel
254
in interstate commerce can escape First Amendment scrutiny.
Yet the obvious purpose of the Twenty-Eighth Amendment is to overrule
Texas v., Johnson2 55 and United States v. Eichman,25 6 which held that laws
proscribing flag desecration violate the First Amendment. Even if textually
sound, Doe's argument seemingly founders on the intent of the Framers and
Ratifiers of the Twenty-Eighth Amendment.
Perhaps we do not need to rely on an intentionalist refutation of Doe's
argument. Might we characterize Doe's proposed construction as unsound
because it would render the Twenty-Eighth Amendment textually superfluous?
What would be the point of granting the government a power that it cannot
exercise without violating some other constitutional provision?
This textual argument does not quite work, however. Johnson and Eichman
do not address the question of whether the federal government possesses the
affirmative power to proscribe flag-desecration; after United States v. Lopez,25 7
the argument that the federal government lacks this power is hardly frivolous.
Thus, the Twenty-Eighth Amendment lifts a potential bar to the enactment of

the Flag Protection Act. It would not be absurd to suppose that Congress and the
States would have wished to lift this bar but leave to the Supreme Court the task
of determining whether to overrule Johnson and Eichman as a matter of First
Amendment law.25 8 Thus, to say that Doe's argument obviously fails would
seem to require some recourse to the obvious intent of those who adopted the
Twenty-Eighth Amendment.
254. See Doff, supra note 207, at 1190-91.
255. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
256. 496 U.S. 310 (1990).
257. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
258. Of course, the Twenty-Eighth Amendment also authorizes the states to proscribe flag desecration. But the states do not derive their powers from the Federal Constitution. See supra text accompanying notes 232-44. Accepting Doe's proposed reading thus would render the Twenty-Eighth Amendment
a complete nullity as to the states. If this fact ought to inform our interpretation of the Twenty-Eighth
Amendment's application to the federal government-and I cannot say why it should not-for
illustrative purposes we may assume for the remainder of the discussion that the hypothetical TwentyEighth Amendment refers only to the federal government and is silent as to the states.
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Next consider a different strategy for avoiding intentionalism. When a court
considers the meaning of a recently enacted amendment, the original understanding and the contemporary understanding are one and the same. No time has
elapsed during which the original understanding could have been forgotten or
rendered irrelevant. Thus, to say that the obvious intent of the Framers and
Ratifiers controls is only to say that the contemporary understanding controls.
This point no doubt holds for a large class of cases. For example, it plays a
role in explaining why the courts routinely look to the decisions of the First
Congress to recover the original understanding of the Constitution.2 5 9 But in the
case I have hypothesized, the equivalence runs in the opposite direction. In
1997, people generally understand that the Twenty-Eighth Amendment overrules Johnson and Eichman because they remember that this was what the
Amendment's proponent's intended (and what its opponents feared). In this
case, the contemporary understanding rests on a kind of intentionalism rather
than vice-versa.
If, as I believe, we require some version of the social-contractarian view to
account for our intuitions regarding the Twenty-Eighth Amendment, how broad
a scope must we give to that view? For example, suppose that Doe's case arises
100 years after the adoption of the Twenty-Eighth Amendment. Would it be any
more appropriate at that time to discount the views of its Adopters than it would
be today? I would like to say that it would be.
Usually the mere passage of time will obscure the once "obvious" meaning
of a constitutional provision. 26 0 The difficulties of reconstructing the original
context will plague the quest to recover the original meaning. Accordingly,
beginning with a more uncertain footing, the interpreter will feel less secure
deferring to the original meaning.
Let us put such problems to one side, however. Suppose that in the particular
case, the historical record has preserved the original understanding with great
clarity. Might the late twenty-first-century judge still legitimately devalue the
original meaning of the Twenty-Eighth Amendment?
Support for doing just this comes from an unlikely source-the countermajoritarian difficulty. As Ackerman notes, the countermajoritarian difficulty is really
an "intertemporal difficulty.", 26 ' Ackerman answers the countermajoritarian
difficulty by pointing out that the Constitution invoked by the judge to supersede the current majority will was itself the product of a majority-indeed, it
was the product of a supermajority of the People acting as creators of higher

259. See, e.g., Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 136, 174-76 (1926); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S.
(6 Wheat.) 264, 420 (1821); Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 309 (1803). Cf Adamson v.
California, 332 U.S. 46, 64 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (deferring to an earlier interpretation of
the Fourteenth Amendment "by judges who were themselves witnesses of the process by which the
Fourteenth Amendment became part of the Constitution").
260. See Brest, supra note 1, at 208.
261. Ackerman, supra note 27, at 1045-49.
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law. 262 Thus,

the question becomes: why should the modem majority bow to the
older (super)majority? For Ackerman, dualism provides the answer. The older
majority
created higher law while the modem majority produced only ordinary
3
26

law.

As discussed in Part III, Ackerman sees higher law as deriving its content
entirely from discrete acts of the higher lawmaking capacity of the Peopleconstitutional moments that result in formal text or in informal amendments.
What happens if we replace Ackerman's account of the generation of constitutional norms with an eclecticism that recognizes that a variety of changing
factors together produce constitutional meaning at any one time? We will then
see the passage of time as quite relevant to the interpretive exercise--even
when the original meaning remains clear after many years.
Begin with the case of contemporary interpretation of the Twenty-Eighth
Amendment. It would be illegitimate to accept Doe's argument that the Amendment leaves Johnson and Eichman undisturbed primarily because such an
interpretation would thwart the supermajority will that produced the Amendment. Of course, there may be occasions when the text enacted so differs from
the intent of its adopters that we must conclude that the drafters failed in their
objectives. But surely the Twenty-Eighth Amendment does not constitute such a
failure. Reading the Twenty-Eighth Amendment to overrule Johnson and Eichman is almost certainly the best textual interpretation. Therefore, to read it
otherwise would deny the power of a supermajority to use Article V to engineer
constitutional change.
A century later, however, the problem's complexion changes. Now a reading
contrary to the original understanding does not thwart an existing supermajority
will. It does thwart the will of a past supermajority, but this should not bother an
eclectic. Any time changed circumstances or changed norms result in .a departure from original understanding, a past supermajority's will is arguably thwarted.
The core value that supported a contemporary intentionalist interpretation of the
Twenty-Eighth Amendment was (super)majoritarianism. In the later era, the
case does not directly implicate this value so that the other forms of argument
dominate.26 4
Expanding my hypothetical example, assume that the court interpreting the
Twenty-Eighth Amendment a century after its adoption faces a case that is
essentially the paradigm case that inspired the Amendment.2 65 We see that even
in such a case, the strength of originalist arguments diminishes over time-both

262. Id. at 1049-50.
263. Id.
264. Applying this account to statutory construction would require paying greater attention to
legislative history in the period immediately following a statute's adoption than in later periods. See
EsKRIDGE, supra note 55, at 48-80 (describing the practice of dynamic statutory interpretation); id. at
207-38 (describing the uses of legislative history during different periods).
265. See Rubenfeld, supra note 117, at 1169-77 (explaining the role of paradigm cases).
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because the original understanding no longer necessarily commands supermajority support and because the intervening experience provides the later court with
lessons that were unavailable earlier. Originalist arguments weaken even more
when the case for decision involves a situation that the provision's adopters did
not intend to address directly.
To illustrate the diminishing utility of original meaning over time, let us
borrow from Ackerman an explanation that makes sense in an eclectic context
as well: When a constitutional provision is first enacted, it typically functions as
a sort of super-statute.2 6 6 Situations within the core of such new provisions
present the strongest cases for intentionalism. With the passage of time, an
amendment becomes absorbed into the entire corpus of the Constitution. The
requirement of intergenerational synthesis is as strong for an eclectic as it is for
a neo-originalist like Ackerman. Thus, the pull of social-contractarianism
diminishes as the factual context shifts from the core paradigm case and as time
passes.26 7
Consider one more example. Suppose that some substantial time after the
adoption of the Twenty-Eighth Amendment, Texas prosecutes John Roe for
burning a Texas state flag in violation of the Texas State Flag Protection Act,
which makes "the physical desecration of the flag of the State of Texas" an
offense punishable by imprisonment for one year. Roe moves to quash the
indictment on the ground that the First Amendment protects his act and that the
Twenty-Eighth Amendment by its terms only removes protection against charges
of desecrating a United States flag. Roe's textual argument is strong, but is it
unassailable?
Critics of the Court's flag-burning decisions tend to advance two principal
arguments. First, they argue that the American flag is a unique symbol, so that
the doctrinal categories applicable to other communicative acts have no bearing
268 Second, they argue that proscriptions of the physical act
on flag desecration. 261
of burning a flag regulate conduct rather than expression. 6 9 One can invoke
both of these arguments in support of the Twenty-Eighth Amendment.
If one views the Twenty-Eighth Amendment as resting on the first premise,
then Roe's argument should prevail. Under this view, the Texas state flag does
not possess the unique status that the Twenty-Eighth Amendment requires us to
understand as inhering in the American flag. On the other hand, if the TwentyEighth Amendment stands for a repudiation of the Supreme Court's overall
approach to symbolic speech, then the State of Texas may punish Roe. The

266. See ACKERMAN, supra note 13, at 96-99; Richard A. Posner, The Uncertain Protection of
Privacy by the Supreme Court, 1979 SuP. CT. REV. 173, 196 n.63 (comparing individual constitutional
provisions to individual precedent cases as they function in the common-law method).
267. See DWORKIN, supra note 28, at 348-50, 388-89 (discussing the diminishing relevance of
original legislative history over time in statutory and constitutional interpretation); Rubenfeld, supra
note 117, at 1176.
268. See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 421 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
269. See id. at 438 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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physical act of burning a Texas flag is no more (or less) speech than the physical
act of burning an American flag.
Civil libertarians would like to limit the damage that the Twenty-Eighth
Amendment does to the beloved First Amendment. Thus, they (we) will prefer
to read the Twenty-Eighth Amendment as resting on the uniqueness of the
American flag. As a textual matter, this is sound. Johnson rests on the proposition that the First Amendment does not permit the government to distinguish
between the communicative burning of a United States flag and other symbolic
speech.270 The civil libertarian can argue that although there is no principled
way to distinguish burning a United States flag from burning a state flag, the
express text of the Constitution dispenses with the need for a principled
distinction. The text simply requires us to treat the United States flag as sui
generis, even if as a matter of logic this is an unsustainable proposition.
I would like to say that this is the best understanding of the Twenty-Eighth
Amendment. But I suspect that a commitment to synthesis requires that we first
consider whether a principled reconciliation can be accomplished. If the Nineteenth Amendment informs our understanding of the application of the Fourteenth Amendment to gender discrimination,27 ' it is hard to see why the
Twenty-Eighth Amendment should not inform our understanding of the application of the First Amendment to state flag desecration.2 72
However one resolves this synthetic question, originalist arguments appear to
play a fairly minor role. The paradigm case inspiring the Twenty-Eighth Amendment is the burning of a United States flag. Virtually all of the evidence
regarding the Framers' and Ratifiers' intent will concern this question. Even if
one attempts to "apply" that intent to a new context such as the burning of a
state flag, the process will be inevitably interpretive. At that point, eclecticism
opens the door to a host of nonintentionalist arguments, which will tend to
crowd out intentionalist ones.
There may be an irreducible role for social-contractarian originalism in
270. See id. at 417 (opinion of the Court).
271. See supra text accompanying notes 70-73.
272. Indeed, Christopher Eisgruber has argued that to treat the flag-desecration amendment as an
unprincipled exception would be problematic because it would require us to forego the proposition that
constitutional provisions are statements of principle rather than legislative records. See Christopher L.
Eisgruber, Birthright Citizenship and the Constitution, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV.54, 86-87 (1997). I fear that
some aspects of our Constitution must be seen as legislative records, however. Three examples should
illustrate my position. First, I view the unrepresentativeness of the Senate as the unfortunate legacy of
contingent historical circumstances. Second, I view the Constitution's failure to set forth a mechanism
guaranteeing the basic human needs of the poor as a product of an excessively individualistic ideal of
the good life that plays a significant role in American culture but not in the cultures of all other
industrial democracies. Third, I regard such provisions as the Fifth Amendment right to indictment by a
grand jury and the Seventh Amendment right to a jury in civil cases at law as acceptable if inefficient
procedural devices, but I do not see how they can be understood as elaborating essential principles of
justice. Although I agree with Eisgruber that we should interpret the Constitution in a principled
manner, I see no reason to assume that all of the Constitution's provisions can be founded on the basis
of substantively just first principles. Thus, I do not think that a Twenty-Eighth Amendment that applied
only to buming the United States flag necessarily would intrduce insurmountable jurisprudential difficulties.
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constitutional interpretation. That role is a small one, however. Socialcontractarian originalism operates principally in cases that are factually and
temporally quite close to the paradigm cases that inspired the relevant provision.
VIII. CONCLUSION
How can we make sense of the role that originalist arguments play in eclectic
constitutional interpretation? Conventional originalism rests on the political
premise that legitimacy derives from following the intentions of the original
lawmakers. If we accept that this premise ever holds, do we render illegitimate
all decisions that are not based on such intentions?
The easy answer is to say that an eclectic need only accept original meaning
as one source of legitimacy. Conventional eclectics like Fallon use this strategy.
This approach is conceptually coherent in the sense that there is no logical
contradiction in saying that constitutional law derives its legitimacy from a
variety of sources. But the conventional strategy relies on a definitional fiat:
Where originalism's usual premises challenge the legitimacy of other sources,
conventional eclecticism redefines originalism as resting on a theory positing
that the social contract only partially accounts for legitimacy.2 73 Can we do
better by seeking an understanding of arguments based on original meaning that
coheres with the premises of nonoriginalist eclecticism?
I have argued here that we can. First, eclectics should recognize that most
originalist arguments do not necessarily rest on the social-contractarian conception of originalism. Instead, the eclectic can see such arguments as involving
claims about context, ancestral or heroic originalism, and the lessons of history.
Eclectics can readily integrate these arguments into a coherent philosophy of
constitutional law.
Second, our Constitution's presumption in favor of democratic processes
provides support for according weight to conventional originalist arguments in
the relatively rare cases that are close in time and factual setting to the events
inspiring a constitutional amendment. Reliance on democratic values in this
small class of cases poses a correspondingly small challenge to the legitimacy
of other forms of argument. The challenge is small because our constitutional
tradition does not rest solely on democratic values.2 74
273. In this sense, conventional eclecticism relies on what Laurence Tribe and I have described as
"exception-barring." TRIBE & DORF, supra note 26, at 89-96 (citing IMRE LAKATOS, PROOFS AND
REFUTATIONS: THE LOGIC OF MATHEMATICAL DISCOVERY (1976)). "
274. See Henry P. Monaghan, We the People[s], Original Understanding, and Constitutional
Amendment, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 121, 127-28 (1996) (arguing that the assumption that a majority vote in
a national referendum could suffice to ratify a constitutional amendment notwithstanding Article V
misapprehends the limited role that simple majoritarianism plays in our constitutional order); Lawrence
G. Sager, The Incorrigible Constitution, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 893, 900-09 (1990) (arguing that the mere
fact of supermajoritarian ratification of the original Constitution and subsequent amendments does not
ensure its fidelity to principles of supermajority rule). Alternatively, we might say that the conception of
democracy embodied in American constitutionalism does not give automatic deference to majority (or
even supermajority) decisionmaking. See DWORKIN, supra note 133, at 15-20.

